Title :
Attrition and preemption in credit/debit cards incentives: models and experiments
Author_Institution :
Exp. Econ., Todol Services Inc., Miami, FL, USA
Abstract :
Incentives might guide marketing actions according to bank politics and Basel Core Principles which include partner\´s behavior. These patterns may optimize a utility function, represent simple preferences, or may be irrational. An incitement to cooperate "using a credit/debit card product frequently", produces a surplus to be distributed between diners club international (Principal), partners (agents) and merchants (establishments). The author uses the bimatrix chicken game as a paradigm of incitement to cooperate. The net current value represents the utility function. The author determines the microeconomic characteristics of the partner\´s behavior which include: risk aversion or risk loving. The individual preferences related to risk will allow us to make decisions based on when, how and to whom the incentives are given.
Keywords :
credit transactions; debit transactions; economic cybernetics; game theory; optimisation; Basel Core Principles; attrition; bank politics; bimatrix chicken game; credit/debit card incentives; diners club international; marketing actions; merchants; microeconomic characteristics; net current value; partner behavior; preemption; quantal response equilibria; risk aversion; risk loving; utility function; Animals; Banking; Convergence; Employment; Fuel economy; Microeconomics; Oligopoly; Protection; Psychology; Research and development;
Conference_Titel :
Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 IEEE International Conference on
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-7654-4
DOI :
10.1109/CIFER.2003.1196258