DocumentCode
393760
Title
Attrition and preemption in credit/debit cards incentives: models and experiments
Author
Jimenez, Edward
Author_Institution
Exp. Econ., Todol Services Inc., Miami, FL, USA
fYear
2003
fDate
20-23 March 2003
Firstpage
175
Lastpage
182
Abstract
Incentives might guide marketing actions according to bank politics and Basel Core Principles which include partner\´s behavior. These patterns may optimize a utility function, represent simple preferences, or may be irrational. An incitement to cooperate "using a credit/debit card product frequently", produces a surplus to be distributed between diners club international (Principal), partners (agents) and merchants (establishments). The author uses the bimatrix chicken game as a paradigm of incitement to cooperate. The net current value represents the utility function. The author determines the microeconomic characteristics of the partner\´s behavior which include: risk aversion or risk loving. The individual preferences related to risk will allow us to make decisions based on when, how and to whom the incentives are given.
Keywords
credit transactions; debit transactions; economic cybernetics; game theory; optimisation; Basel Core Principles; attrition; bank politics; bimatrix chicken game; credit/debit card incentives; diners club international; marketing actions; merchants; microeconomic characteristics; net current value; partner behavior; preemption; quantal response equilibria; risk aversion; risk loving; utility function; Animals; Banking; Convergence; Employment; Fuel economy; Microeconomics; Oligopoly; Protection; Psychology; Research and development;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 IEEE International Conference on
Print_ISBN
0-7803-7654-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CIFER.2003.1196258
Filename
1196258
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