Value of Storage in Distribution Grids—Competition or Cooperation of Stakeholders?

The implementation of storage capacities in distribution grids is seen as an important element for the integration of fluctuating feed-in caused by photovoltaic and wind generators. However, the responsibility for the operating of these assets is not defined in most market designs. Since decreasing costs are to be expected with further market penetration, next to distribution grid operators (DSO) further storage stake holders may be interested in controlling local storage devices. In this paper optimal storage profiles for different stakeholders (DSO and energy traders) are derived based on a case study with real world data. The results reveal conflicting interests-peak shaving of fluctuating feed-in (objective o the DSO to avoid reinforcements) is hampered significantly by storage usage of trading companies (objective of exploiting price spreads in the spot market). It is shown that unreasonable high costs occur with undesired economical side-effects if no control or cooperation mechanism is implemented.