Methodology for attack on a Java-based PDA

Although mobile Java code is frequently executed on many wireless devices, the susceptibility to electromagnetic (EM) attacks is largely unknown. If analysis of EM waves emanating from the wireless device during a cryptographic computation does leak sufficient information, it may be possible for an attacker to reconstruct the secret key. Possession of the secret cryptographic key would render all future wireless communications insecure and cause further potential problems such as identity theft. Despite the complexities of a Java-based PDA device, this paper proposes and verifies a methodology which confirms EM attacks are possible. The proposed methodology involves pre-characterization of the PDA device through SEMA, thresholding, pattern recognition, and frequency-based DEMA. Results are repeatable over several different secret keys. Unlike previous research the new methodology does not require perfect alignment of EM frames and demonstrates robustness in the presence of a complex embedded system. This research is important for future wireless embedded systems which will increasingly demand higher levels of security.