Impact of generators’ different bidding strategies on system nash equilibrium point

Unlike to perfect competitive markets, in electricity oligopoly markets due to strategic producers and transmission constraints Gencos may increase their own profit through strategic biddings. This paper investigates the problem of developing optimal bidding strategies of generators in two cases when they all bid strategically and when some of them alter their biddings in order to exercise market power. The problem is modeled as a bi-level optimization that at the first level each generator maximizes its payoff through strategic bidding and at the second level a system dispatch is accomplished through an OPF problem. The AC power flow model is used for proposed OPF that considers ancillary services as well. Using proposed model optimal bidding strategies of generators in order to achieve to the most profit while considering system constraints are presented and impact of of generators´ different bidding strategies on system Nash equilibrium point is studied. Finally IEEE-30 bus test system is used for case study to demonstrate simulation results.