Title :
The Study on the Incentive Issues of All-Involvement Technological Innovation Based on Organizational Slack
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Xuchang Univ., Xuchang, China
Abstract :
Based on the analysis frames of the multi-task principal-agent model, this paper formulates a model of principal-agent on the condition of asymmetrical information while employees are engaged in the "official duty" and the informal technological innovation based on organizational slack. Through the analysis of the model, this paper obtains the optimal incentive contracts while R&D staff, marketing personnel and production personnel are engaged in the "official duty" and the informal technological innovation based on organizational slack at the same time, which provides the theoretical basis of formulating the incentive policies of all-involvement innovation in a firm.
Keywords :
incentive schemes; innovation management; all-involvement technological innovation; incentive issues; multi-task principal-agent model; optimal incentive contracts; organizational slack; Conference management; Contracts; Industrial engineering; Information management; Innovation management; Personnel; Project management; Research and development; Technological innovation; Technology management; all-involvement innovation; incentive; multi-task agent model; organizational slack; principal-agent; technological innovation;
Conference_Titel :
Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering, 2009 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Xi´an
Print_ISBN :
978-0-7695-3876-1
DOI :
10.1109/ICIII.2009.178