Title :
Analysis of a Variant of McCullagh-Barreto Key Agreement Protocol
Author :
Han, Guangguo ; Cheng, Qingfeng ; Ma, Chuangui
Author_Institution :
Inst. of Math., Hangzhou Dianzi Univ., Hangzhou, China
Abstract :
Recently, Wang et al. present a variant of McCullagh-Barreto key agreement protocol with key compromise impersonation resilience. Furthermore, they proof that their protocol can achieve perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we will show that their new protocol can´ t resist ephemeral key compromise attack, and only achieves weak perfect forward secrecy.
Keywords :
protocols; security of data; McCullagh-Barreto key agreement protocol; key compromise impersonation resilience; perfect forward secrecy; Computer science; Computer science education; Cryptographic protocols; Educational technology; Identity-based encryption; Information analysis; Mathematics; Resilience; Resists; Security; authenticated key agreement; ephemeral key compromise attack; weak perfect forward secrecy;
Conference_Titel :
Education Technology and Computer Science (ETCS), 2010 Second International Workshop on
Conference_Location :
Wuhan
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6388-6
Electronic_ISBN :
978-1-4244-6389-3
DOI :
10.1109/ETCS.2010.498
