DocumentCode
514742
Title
Analysis of a Variant of McCullagh-Barreto Key Agreement Protocol
Author
Han, Guangguo ; Cheng, Qingfeng ; Ma, Chuangui
Author_Institution
Inst. of Math., Hangzhou Dianzi Univ., Hangzhou, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
6-7 March 2010
Firstpage
506
Lastpage
508
Abstract
Recently, Wang et al. present a variant of McCullagh-Barreto key agreement protocol with key compromise impersonation resilience. Furthermore, they proof that their protocol can achieve perfect forward secrecy. In this paper, we will show that their new protocol can´ t resist ephemeral key compromise attack, and only achieves weak perfect forward secrecy.
Keywords
protocols; security of data; McCullagh-Barreto key agreement protocol; key compromise impersonation resilience; perfect forward secrecy; Computer science; Computer science education; Cryptographic protocols; Educational technology; Identity-based encryption; Information analysis; Mathematics; Resilience; Resists; Security; authenticated key agreement; ephemeral key compromise attack; weak perfect forward secrecy;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Education Technology and Computer Science (ETCS), 2010 Second International Workshop on
Conference_Location
Wuhan
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-6388-6
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-6389-3
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ETCS.2010.498
Filename
5458896
Link To Document