Research on the revelation mechanism of status of partners´ infrastructure in logistics enterprise alliance

Author

Hu, Zhengdong ; Li, Xiamiao ; Liu, Dapeng ; Tan, Feiyan

Author_Institution

Sch. of Traffic & Transp. Eng., Central South Univ., Changsha, China

Volume

2

fYear

2010

fDate

9-10 Jan. 2010

Firstpage

1008

Lastpage

1012

Abstract

Partners in logistics enterprise alliance show the true state of its infrastructure, which is the premise to achieve efficient operation of the alliance. In the practice, the partners maybe don´t show their real status of infrastructure in pursuit of maximizing their own interests. Based on theory of mechanism design and revelation mechanism in game theory, this paper establishes principal-agent model in order to maximize the central logistics enterprises´ interests. The model spurs partners to be honest by punishing partners who can not show their true state of infrastructure, and makes them unprofitable. The empirical analysis of this model has been verified.

Keywords

game theory; logistics; game theory; logistics enterprise alliance; partners infrastructure; principal-agent model; revelation mechanism; Algorithm design and analysis; Data envelopment analysis; Distribution strategy; Game theory; Globalization; Information systems; Internet; Logistics; Toy industry; Transportation; Game Theory; Logistics Enterprise Alliance; Partners; Revelation Mechanism;

fLanguage

English

Publisher

ieee

Conference_Titel

Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on

Conference_Location

Harbin

Print_ISBN

978-1-4244-7331-1

Type

conf

DOI

10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461107

Filename

5461107