• DocumentCode
    515266
  • Title

    Do mergers improve the shareholders´ wealth of acquirers? Evidence from the CTAR method

  • Author

    Yan-fang, XU ; Kuang-yu, Wen ; Yan, Wang

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Bus., Renmin Univ. of China, Beijing, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    9-10 Jan. 2010
  • Firstpage
    342
  • Lastpage
    347
  • Abstract
    We investigate the long-run M&A performance of the listed firms in China based on a sample with a comprehensive 67 transactions. Using the Calendar-Time Abnormal Return method (CTAR), this paper finds that the performance of acquirers generally underperforms after the mergers. More over, the performance of acquirers marked by related party transactions, strong management ability or small size underperforms significantly compared with the performance of those marked by non-related party transactions, weak management ability or big size. In general, M&A activities in China actually destroy the shareholders´ wealth of acquirers. It is indicated from our results that the traditional synergy theory can not explain M&A activities in China well. In contrast, tunneling theory, agency theory and hubris theory can better account for the long-run performance and motives of M&A within Chinese listed firms.
  • Keywords
    corporate acquisitions; financial management; China; acquisition; agency theory; calendar-time abnormal return method; hubris theory; management ability; mergers; related party transactions; shareholder wealth; tunneling theory; Calendars; Corporate acquisitions; Insurance; Portfolios; Process design; Size control; Stock markets; Testing; Tunneling; Acquirers; CTAR; Long-run M&A Performance; Shareholders-Wealth;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Harbin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7331-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461406
  • Filename
    5461406