DocumentCode
515266
Title
Do mergers improve the shareholders´ wealth of acquirers? Evidence from the CTAR method
Author
Yan-fang, XU ; Kuang-yu, Wen ; Yan, Wang
Author_Institution
Sch. of Bus., Renmin Univ. of China, Beijing, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
9-10 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
342
Lastpage
347
Abstract
We investigate the long-run M&A performance of the listed firms in China based on a sample with a comprehensive 67 transactions. Using the Calendar-Time Abnormal Return method (CTAR), this paper finds that the performance of acquirers generally underperforms after the mergers. More over, the performance of acquirers marked by related party transactions, strong management ability or small size underperforms significantly compared with the performance of those marked by non-related party transactions, weak management ability or big size. In general, M&A activities in China actually destroy the shareholders´ wealth of acquirers. It is indicated from our results that the traditional synergy theory can not explain M&A activities in China well. In contrast, tunneling theory, agency theory and hubris theory can better account for the long-run performance and motives of M&A within Chinese listed firms.
Keywords
corporate acquisitions; financial management; China; acquisition; agency theory; calendar-time abnormal return method; hubris theory; management ability; mergers; related party transactions; shareholder wealth; tunneling theory; Calendars; Corporate acquisitions; Insurance; Portfolios; Process design; Size control; Stock markets; Testing; Tunneling; Acquirers; CTAR; Long-run M&A Performance; Shareholders-Wealth;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7331-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461406
Filename
5461406
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