• DocumentCode
    515272
  • Title

    Executive compensation gaps, promotion probability and corporate performance

  • Author

    Qingfeng, Cai ; Jiao, Chen ; Zhirui, Zeng

  • Author_Institution
    Finance Dept, Xiamen Univ., Xiamen, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    9-10 Jan. 2010
  • Firstpage
    310
  • Lastpage
    314
  • Abstract
    In the past few years, especially since the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis, the issue of Executive compensation has become not only a public, but also an academic focus of controversy. This paper conducts an empirical study on the determinants of compensation gaps with 791 Chinese listed companies from 2000 to 2007. The result shows that there is a significantly negative relation between compensation gaps and promotion probability. After that, this paper turns to another empirical study on the relation between compensation gaps and corporate performance with 878 Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2007. The result of our research is in favor of the tournament incentive theory, which demonstrates a significantly positive relation between compensation gaps and corporate performance.
  • Keywords
    incentive schemes; organisational aspects; salaries; corporate performance; executive compensation gaps; promotion probability; tournament incentive theory; Disaster management; Finance; Financial management; Government; Incentive schemes; Industrial relations; Project management; Remuneration; Security; Tsunami; Compensation Gaps; Corporate Performance; Promotion Probability; Tournaments Incentive Theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Harbin
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7331-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461415
  • Filename
    5461415