DocumentCode
515272
Title
Executive compensation gaps, promotion probability and corporate performance
Author
Qingfeng, Cai ; Jiao, Chen ; Zhirui, Zeng
Author_Institution
Finance Dept, Xiamen Univ., Xiamen, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
9-10 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
310
Lastpage
314
Abstract
In the past few years, especially since the outbreak of the sub-prime crisis, the issue of Executive compensation has become not only a public, but also an academic focus of controversy. This paper conducts an empirical study on the determinants of compensation gaps with 791 Chinese listed companies from 2000 to 2007. The result shows that there is a significantly negative relation between compensation gaps and promotion probability. After that, this paper turns to another empirical study on the relation between compensation gaps and corporate performance with 878 Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2007. The result of our research is in favor of the tournament incentive theory, which demonstrates a significantly positive relation between compensation gaps and corporate performance.
Keywords
incentive schemes; organisational aspects; salaries; corporate performance; executive compensation gaps; promotion probability; tournament incentive theory; Disaster management; Finance; Financial management; Government; Incentive schemes; Industrial relations; Project management; Remuneration; Security; Tsunami; Compensation Gaps; Corporate Performance; Promotion Probability; Tournaments Incentive Theory;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7331-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461415
Filename
5461415
Link To Document