DocumentCode
515290
Title
Analysis of quality game behavior for cold-chain logistics outsourcing
Author
Na, Chen ; Lei, Shi
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage., Dalian Jiaotong Univ., Dalian, China
Volume
1
fYear
2010
fDate
9-10 Jan. 2010
Firstpage
202
Lastpage
206
Abstract
Whether there is an optimal cooperation pattern of quality investment strategy between the third party logistics provider and its subcontractor in cold-chain logistics industry was discussed. Based on game theory, Nash Equilibrium, Stackelberg Equilibrium, and the cooperative equilibrium pattern with the quality policies and credibility factors of both sides were analyzed. The provider and subcontractor would reach state of equilibrium in quality investment strategies when the provider subcontracted the logistics business or part of the business to the subcontractor. The results show that they will not be likely to choose the state of equilibrium maximizing total benefits of both sides, due to the chasing of their own interests. These mathematical models provide an important foundation for monitoring and optimizing the quality investment strategy of the provider and subcontractor in cold-chain logistics outsourcing.
Keywords
game theory; logistics; quality management; supply chain management; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium; cold-chain logistics outsourcing; cooperative equilibrium pattern; credibility factor; game theory; optimal cooperation pattern; quality game behavior; quality investment strategy; quality policy; Companies; Costs; Food manufacturing; Food products; Investments; Logistics; Outsourcing; Quality control; Refrigeration; Subcontracting; Cold-chain Logistics; Game Theory; Subcontract;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Logistics Systems and Intelligent Management, 2010 International Conference on
Conference_Location
Harbin
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-7331-1
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICLSIM.2010.5461436
Filename
5461436
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