• DocumentCode
    526425
  • Title

    Bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes without pairing nor random oracle

  • Author

    Wang, Xu An ; Wei, Ping ; Zhong, Weidong ; Yang, Xiaoyuan

  • Author_Institution
    Key Lab. of Inf. & Network Security, Eng. Coll. of Chinese Armed Police Force, Xi´´an, China
  • Volume
    5
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    9-11 July 2010
  • Firstpage
    674
  • Lastpage
    677
  • Abstract
    Blaze et al. in 1998 introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption, which allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext computed under Alice´s public key into one that can be opened under Bob´s decryption key. In CCS´07, Canetti et al. proposed an IND-PRE-CCA2 bidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme, and later, Libert et al. proposed another IND-PRE-CCA2 secure unidirectional proxy re-encryption. However, both schemes rely on the costly bilinear pairings. In CANS´08, Deng et al. proposed the first IND-PRE-CCA2 secure proxy re-encryption without parings. Later, in PKC´09, Shao et al. proposed another IND-PRE-CCA2 secure proxy re-encryption without parings. But both of these schemes prove their security in the random oracle. In this paper, based on Hanaoka´s efficient chosen ciphertext secure public key encryption under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption, we present two new interesting bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes, which are restricted IND-PRE-CCA2 secure without pairing nor random oracle.
  • Keywords
    public key cryptography; Alice public key; Bob decryption key; bidirectional proxy re-encryption; bilinear pairings; ciphertext; computational Diffie-Hellman assumption; public key encryption; Cryptography; Indium tin oxide; Radio access networks;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computer Science and Information Technology (ICCSIT), 2010 3rd IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Chengdu
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5537-9
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICCSIT.2010.5564002
  • Filename
    5564002