• DocumentCode
    531506
  • Title

    Incentivising Cooperation between Agents for Content Sharing

  • Author

    Allen, S.M. ; Chorley, M.J. ; Colombo, G.B. ; Whitaker, R.M.

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput. Sci. & Inf., Cardiff Univ., Cardiff, UK
  • Volume
    2
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    Aug. 31 2010-Sept. 3 2010
  • Firstpage
    79
  • Lastpage
    84
  • Abstract
    The performance of many emerging communication paradigms depend on high levels of cooperation amongst the peers in the network. Although an individual´s best strategy may be to selfishly consume resources without reciprocation, the optimal social performance requires agents in the network to behave in an altruistic manner. This paper considers a P2P data dissemination scenario, and applies an autonomic trust protocol that forms social network structures to incentive cooperation. Trust links are formed according to the simple criterion that `individuals seek to interact with others at least as cooperative as themselves´ and these links are used to prioritise the choice of peers to interact with. The success of the protocol is validated through a prisoner´s dilemma based simulation which uses the similarity of interest between peers to define pay-offs. While the variation in interests reduces the average payoff (per iteration) received by the most cooperative individuals, only the most `divergent´ and uncooperative nodes are heavily affected and ostracized from interaction by other cooperative nodes.
  • Keywords
    incentive schemes; peer-to-peer computing; software agents; P2P data dissemination scenario; altruistic manner; autonomic trust protocol; content sharing; incentive cooperation; optimal social performance; social network structures;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT), 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Toronto, ON
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-8482-9
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-0-7695-4191-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/WI-IAT.2010.145
  • Filename
    5616380