Title :
Cipher-Suite Negotiation for DNSSEC: Hop-by-Hop or End-to-End?
Author :
Herzberg, Amir ; Shulman, Haya
Author_Institution :
Bar Ilan Univ., Ramat Gan, Israel
Abstract :
To ensure the best security and efficiency, cryptographic protocols such as Transport Layer Security and IPsec should let parties negotiate the use of the "best" cryptographic algorithms; this is referred to as cipher-suite negotiation. However, cipher-suite negotiation is lacking in DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC), introducing several problems. To address these issues, the authors propose two designs: hop-by-hop and end-to-end cipher-suite negotiation. They compare these two approaches with respect to efficiency, ease of deployment, changes each would require of the existing infrastructure, and compatibility with the legacy DNS infrastructure and caches.
Keywords :
cryptographic protocols; DNS security extensions; DNSSEC; cryptographic protocols; end-to-end cipher-suite negotiation; hop-by-hop cipher-suite negotiation; Algorithm design and analysis; Ciphers; Computer security; Internet; Signal resolution; DNS security; DNSSEC; adoption obstacles; cipher-suite negotiation; denial of service attacks; interoperability challenges;
Journal_Title :
Internet Computing, IEEE