• DocumentCode
    536442
  • Title

    The Incentive Mechanism of Outsourcing for the Service Vendor: Based on Reputation Effect

  • Author

    Tan Yunqing ; Li Yuanxu

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Bus., Shanghai Lixin Univ. of Commerce, Shanghai, China
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    7-9 Nov. 2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    3
  • Abstract
    The paper establishes and solves a game model with incomplete information between the client and the service vendor. On the basis of reputation concerns, the inner mechanism of outsourcing for the service vendor was discussed. It is shown that the reputation effect can improve the service vendor´s effort level and solve the moral hazard in some extent.
  • Keywords
    game theory; human factors; incentive schemes; outsourcing; game model; moral hazard; outsourcing incentive mechanism; reputation effect; service vendor; Biological system modeling; Contracts; Economics; Games; Industries; Outsourcing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    E-Product E-Service and E-Entertainment (ICEEE), 2010 International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Henan
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-7159-1
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ICEEE.2010.5660127
  • Filename
    5660127
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=536442