DocumentCode
560496
Title
Logistics Finance incentive mechanism design based on principal-agent theory
Author
Xiao, Fei
Author_Institution
Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Wuhan Polytech. Univ., Wuhan, China
Volume
1
fYear
2011
fDate
9-11 Dec. 2011
Firstpage
662
Lastpage
665
Abstract
This paper constructs an incentive logistics finance model based on the principal-agent theory applied to incentive logistics finance mechanism. Through constructing and analyzing model, it concludes that the best effort coefficient of team and the optimal excitation strength of financial institution are determined on the team co-factor, risk aversion, effort cost coefficient and the variance of output. Also it designs the incentive system from the financial institution to the team of logistic enterprise and finance enterprise according to the conclusion. It breaks through the traditional qualitative research and the basic concepts of limited logistics finance and it gives the clear direction and measures on incentives of financial institution in practice.
Keywords
finance; incentive schemes; logistics; finance enterprise; financial institution; logistic enterprise; logistics finance incentive mechanism design; principal-agent theory; risk aversion; team co-factor; Companies; Contracts; Economics; Finance; Games; Logistics; incentive; logistics finance; logistics finance services; principal-agent theory;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
IT in Medicine and Education (ITME), 2011 International Symposium on
Conference_Location
Cuangzhou
Print_ISBN
978-1-61284-701-6
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ITiME.2011.6130748
Filename
6130748
Link To Document