• DocumentCode
    560496
  • Title

    Logistics Finance incentive mechanism design based on principal-agent theory

  • Author

    Xiao, Fei

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., Wuhan Polytech. Univ., Wuhan, China
  • Volume
    1
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    9-11 Dec. 2011
  • Firstpage
    662
  • Lastpage
    665
  • Abstract
    This paper constructs an incentive logistics finance model based on the principal-agent theory applied to incentive logistics finance mechanism. Through constructing and analyzing model, it concludes that the best effort coefficient of team and the optimal excitation strength of financial institution are determined on the team co-factor, risk aversion, effort cost coefficient and the variance of output. Also it designs the incentive system from the financial institution to the team of logistic enterprise and finance enterprise according to the conclusion. It breaks through the traditional qualitative research and the basic concepts of limited logistics finance and it gives the clear direction and measures on incentives of financial institution in practice.
  • Keywords
    finance; incentive schemes; logistics; finance enterprise; financial institution; logistic enterprise; logistics finance incentive mechanism design; principal-agent theory; risk aversion; team co-factor; Companies; Contracts; Economics; Finance; Games; Logistics; incentive; logistics finance; logistics finance services; principal-agent theory;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    IT in Medicine and Education (ITME), 2011 International Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Cuangzhou
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-61284-701-6
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/ITiME.2011.6130748
  • Filename
    6130748