Title :
Further Improved Deep Differential Fault Analysis on Camellia
Author :
Zhao Xinjie ; Wang Tao ; Guo Shize
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. Eng., Ordnance Eng. Coll., Shijiazhuang, China
Abstract :
This paper presents a further improved deep differential fault analysis (DFA) on Camellia. The proposed method can extend the single byte based fault depth into the r-2th round, recover full 8 bytes of the rth round equivalent key, 5-6 bytes of the r-1th round equivalent key, and 1 byte of the r-2th round equivalent key at one time. Experimental results show that: due to the Feistel structure and permutation function design, Camellia is vulnerable to deep DFA attack. 4 and 20 faulty ciphertexts can reduce the key space of Camellia-128 and Camellia-192/256 to 222.2 and 221.2 respectively.
Keywords :
cryptography; Camellia; DFA attack; Feistel structure; deep differential fault analysis; faulty ciphertexts; permutation function design; round equivalent key; Ciphers; Computers; Doped fiber amplifiers; Equations; Mathematical model; Registers; Block cipher; Camellia; Differential fault analysis; Fault depth; Feistel structure; Permutation;
Conference_Titel :
Instrumentation, Measurement, Computer, Communication and Control (IMCCC), 2012 Second International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Harbin
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-5034-1
DOI :
10.1109/IMCCC.2012.211