DocumentCode :
612039
Title :
Pinocchio: Nearly Practical Verifiable Computation
Author :
Parno, Bryan ; Howell, J. ; Gentry, Craig ; Raykova, Mariana
fYear :
2013
fDate :
19-22 May 2013
Firstpage :
238
Lastpage :
252
Abstract :
To instill greater confidence in computations outsourced to the cloud, clients should be able to verify the correctness of the results returned. To this end, we introduce Pinocchio, a built system for efficiently verifying general computations while relying only on cryptographic assumptions. With Pinocchio, the client creates a public evaluation key to describe her computation; this setup is proportional to evaluating the computation once. The worker then evaluates the computation on a particular input and uses the evaluation key to produce a proof of correctness. The proof is only 288 bytes, regardless of the computation performed or the size of the inputs and outputs. Anyone can use a public verification key to check the proof. Crucially, our evaluation on seven applications demonstrates that Pinocchio is efficient in practice too. Pinocchio´s verification time is typically 10ms: 5-7 orders of magnitude less than previous work; indeed Pinocchio is the first general-purpose system to demonstrate verification cheaper than native execution (for some apps). Pinocchio also reduces the worker´s proof effort by an additional 19-60x. As an additional feature, Pinocchio generalizes to zero-knowledge proofs at a negligible cost over the base protocol. Finally, to aid development, Pinocchio provides an end-to-end toolchain that compiles a subset of C into programs that implement the verifiable computation protocol.
Keywords :
C language; cryptographic protocols; formal verification; program compilers; public key cryptography; Pinocchio; base protocol; correctness verification; cryptographic assumptions; end-to-end toolchain; general-purpose system; public evaluation key; public verification key; verifiable computation protocol; zero-knowledge proofs; Cryptography; Encoding; Logic gates; Polynomials; Protocols; Wires;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Berkeley, CA
ISSN :
1081-6011
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-6166-8
Electronic_ISBN :
1081-6011
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SP.2013.47
Filename :
6547113
Link To Document :
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