DocumentCode :
613621
Title :
A resource allocation mechanism using coalition formation and the uncertainty principle of game theory
Author :
Pillai, P.S. ; Rao, Smitha
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Comput., Nat. Univ. of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
fYear :
2013
fDate :
15-18 April 2013
Firstpage :
178
Lastpage :
184
Abstract :
Resource allocation involves assigning resources optimally and economically. In systems such as large server farms, where the demand for resources like the CPU, memory, hard-disk, or even software applications is far beyond the capabilities of a single machine, resource management involving a multitude of resources is necessary. A part of this resource management activity is resource allocation. We present a model-driven approach for optimizing resource allocation in server farms. Coalitions of servers are formed to address requests which demand capabilities beyond those of a single system. We formulate the formation of server coalitions as multiple instances of two-player zero-sum games between the servers and the task scheduler of the server farm. This two-player zero-sum game can be solved using the uncertainty principle of game theory.
Keywords :
game theory; multi-agent systems; queueing theory; resource allocation; scheduling; agent-based resource allocation mechanism; coalition formation; game theory; model-driven approach; resource allocation mechanism; resource management activity; server farms; task scheduler; two-player zero-sum games; uncertainty principle; Entropy; Game theory; Games; Resource management; Servers; Uncertainty; Vectors;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Systems Conference (SysCon), 2013 IEEE International
Conference_Location :
Orlando, FL
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4673-3107-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/SysCon.2013.6549878
Filename :
6549878
Link To Document :
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