DocumentCode
613621
Title
A resource allocation mechanism using coalition formation and the uncertainty principle of game theory
Author
Pillai, P.S. ; Rao, Smitha
Author_Institution
Sch. of Comput., Nat. Univ. of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
fYear
2013
fDate
15-18 April 2013
Firstpage
178
Lastpage
184
Abstract
Resource allocation involves assigning resources optimally and economically. In systems such as large server farms, where the demand for resources like the CPU, memory, hard-disk, or even software applications is far beyond the capabilities of a single machine, resource management involving a multitude of resources is necessary. A part of this resource management activity is resource allocation. We present a model-driven approach for optimizing resource allocation in server farms. Coalitions of servers are formed to address requests which demand capabilities beyond those of a single system. We formulate the formation of server coalitions as multiple instances of two-player zero-sum games between the servers and the task scheduler of the server farm. This two-player zero-sum game can be solved using the uncertainty principle of game theory.
Keywords
game theory; multi-agent systems; queueing theory; resource allocation; scheduling; agent-based resource allocation mechanism; coalition formation; game theory; model-driven approach; resource allocation mechanism; resource management activity; server farms; task scheduler; two-player zero-sum games; uncertainty principle; Entropy; Game theory; Games; Resource management; Servers; Uncertainty; Vectors;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Systems Conference (SysCon), 2013 IEEE International
Conference_Location
Orlando, FL
Print_ISBN
978-1-4673-3107-4
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SysCon.2013.6549878
Filename
6549878
Link To Document