• DocumentCode
    613621
  • Title

    A resource allocation mechanism using coalition formation and the uncertainty principle of game theory

  • Author

    Pillai, P.S. ; Rao, Smitha

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Comput., Nat. Univ. of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    15-18 April 2013
  • Firstpage
    178
  • Lastpage
    184
  • Abstract
    Resource allocation involves assigning resources optimally and economically. In systems such as large server farms, where the demand for resources like the CPU, memory, hard-disk, or even software applications is far beyond the capabilities of a single machine, resource management involving a multitude of resources is necessary. A part of this resource management activity is resource allocation. We present a model-driven approach for optimizing resource allocation in server farms. Coalitions of servers are formed to address requests which demand capabilities beyond those of a single system. We formulate the formation of server coalitions as multiple instances of two-player zero-sum games between the servers and the task scheduler of the server farm. This two-player zero-sum game can be solved using the uncertainty principle of game theory.
  • Keywords
    game theory; multi-agent systems; queueing theory; resource allocation; scheduling; agent-based resource allocation mechanism; coalition formation; game theory; model-driven approach; resource allocation mechanism; resource management activity; server farms; task scheduler; two-player zero-sum games; uncertainty principle; Entropy; Game theory; Games; Resource management; Servers; Uncertainty; Vectors;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Systems Conference (SysCon), 2013 IEEE International
  • Conference_Location
    Orlando, FL
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4673-3107-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SysCon.2013.6549878
  • Filename
    6549878