DocumentCode :
632244
Title :
Research on energy-saving and emission reduction management decision-making: An evolutionary game theoretic model
Author :
Dai Rui ; Xu Chang-xin
Author_Institution :
Bus. Sch., Hohai Univ., Nanjing, China
fYear :
2013
fDate :
17-19 July 2013
Firstpage :
1981
Lastpage :
1986
Abstract :
Because of increasingly serious pollution of the natural environment, the government regulation on enterprise sewage problems has become the important issue of Chinese economic development. Based on the information asymmetry between the government and enterprises, this paper constructs a game dynamic model of restrictions handling and uses evolutionary game theory to copy dynamic analysis of the game model to analyze the motivation of the decision-making of both governments and sewage companies from the microscopic point of view. The model showed the best result is that the factories constraint sewage, while the governments do not take restrictive measures. This result asked the government and the enterprises to set up a good relationship of mutual trust. But this good relationship of mutual trust is not easy to set up, so this paper put forward relevant policy implications for the government.
Keywords :
decision making; environmental economics; evolutionary computation; game theory; government policies; sewage treatment; Chinese economic development; emission reduction management decision-making; energy-saving management decision-making; enterprise sewage problems; evolutionary game theoretic model; factories constraint sewage; game dynamic model; government regulation; information asymmetry; mutual trust relationship; restrictions handling; sewage companies; Analytical models; Game theory; Games; Government; Mathematical model; Pollution; Production facilities; emission reduction; evolutionary game; information asymmetry;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Management Science and Engineering (ICMSE), 2013 International Conference on
Conference_Location :
Harbin
ISSN :
2155-1847
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-0473-0
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/ICMSE.2013.6586536
Filename :
6586536
Link To Document :
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