• DocumentCode
    64705
  • Title

    Prospect Theoretic Analysis of Energy Exchange Among Microgrids

  • Author

    Liang Xiao ; Mandayam, Narayan B. ; Poor, H. Vincent

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Commun. Eng., Xiamen Univ., Xiamen, China
  • Volume
    6
  • Issue
    1
  • fYear
    2015
  • fDate
    Jan. 2015
  • Firstpage
    63
  • Lastpage
    72
  • Abstract
    The energy exchange between microgrids (MGs) that are capable of generating power from renewable energy sources in smart grids is investigated. As MGs are autonomous and have control over their energy exchange, prospect theory is a useful tool to provide a user-centric view on MG power trading. More specifically, in this paper, the energy exchange among MGs that are also connected to a power plant as a backup energy supply is formulated as a prospect theory-based static game and Nash equilibria are provided under various scenarios. The impact of user objective weight is evaluated during the outcome evaluation on the performance of the game. Simulation results show that user subjectivity tends to exaggerate selling and buying probabilities when battery levels are high (and low), and thus decreases the overall utility and increases the amount of the energy bought at either low battery levels or low MG selling prices. Conditions on the pricing system to ensure that the energy exchange system is not impacted by the subjective view of MGs are also provided.
  • Keywords
    distributed power generation; game theory; pricing; MG power trading; Nash equilibria; energy exchange system; microgrids; pricing system; renewable energy sources; theoretic analysis; theory-based static game; Batteries; Decision making; Energy exchange; Games; Generators; Power generation; Smart grids; Energy exchange; game theory; microgrids (MGs); prospect theory (PT);
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Smart Grid, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1949-3053
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TSG.2014.2352335
  • Filename
    6895275