DocumentCode :
654964
Title :
[2010] Avoiding Side-Channel Attacks in Embedded Systems with Non-deterministic Branches
Author :
Malagon, Pedro ; de Goyeneche, Juan-Mariano ; Zapater, Marina ; Moya, Jose
Author_Institution :
Electron. Eng. Dept., Univ. Politec. de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
fYear :
2010
fDate :
17-19 Jan. 2010
Firstpage :
68
Lastpage :
74
Abstract :
In this paper, we suggest handling security in embedded systems by introducing a small architectural change. We propose the use of a non-deterministic branch instruction to generate non-determinism in the execution of encryption algorithms. Non-determinism makes side-channel attacks much more difficult. The experimental results show at least three orders of magnitude improvement in resistance to statistical side-channel attacks for a custom AES implementation, while enhancing its performance at the same time.Compared with previous countermeasures, this architectural-level hiding countermeasure is trivial to integrate in current embedded processor designs, offers similar resistance to side-channel attacks, while maintaining similar power consumption to the unprotected processor.
Keywords :
cryptography; embedded systems; microprocessor chips; architectural change; architectural-level hiding countermeasure; custom AES implementation; embedded processor design; embedded systems; encryption algorithm execution; nondeterminism generation; nondeterministic branch instruction; power consumption; security handling; statistical side-channel attacks; Algorithm design and analysis; Data models; Encryption; Power demand; Program processors; embedded system security; hiding countermeasure; side-channel attacks;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Innovative Architecture for Future Generation High Performance (IWIA), 2010 International Workshop on
Conference_Location :
Kona, HI
ISSN :
1527-1366
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/IWIA.2010.14
Filename :
6685628
Link To Document :
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