Power allocation based on Stackelberg game in a jammer-assisted secure network

In this paper, the problem of improving the secrecy communication for a cooperative jamming based network in which there is a friendly jammer, an eavesdropper and N pairs of sources and destinations is addressed. A Stackelberg game is formulated to tackle the joint utility maximization of the jammer and sources subject to a maximum jamming power constraint at the jammer. In this game, the jammer behaves as the leader and the sources are followers. A uniform pricing algorithm is proposed and we prove in theory that it can maximize the secrecy rate of the system. The Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed game is characterized, and an effective distributed algorithm with guaranteed convergence is proposed. Numerical examples are presented to validate our analysis. It is shown that the proposed distributed algorithm can obtain almost the same performance as the optimal power allocation algorithm. Besides, we also investigate the performance of the proposed distributed algorithm in different scenarios. It is shown that the proposed algorithm can obtain significant improvement for secrecy rate in the sparse scenario where all the nodes are deployed sparsely. It can enhance the secrecy rate for about 0.3 dB.