• DocumentCode
    694157
  • Title

    Pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain based on premium and penalty mechanism

  • Author

    Gao Juhong ; Wang Haiyan ; Han Hongshuai ; Hou Liting

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Manage. & Econ., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
  • fYear
    2013
  • fDate
    10-13 Dec. 2013
  • Firstpage
    896
  • Lastpage
    900
  • Abstract
    This work analyzes the pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) based on premium and penalty mechanism under decentralized decision-making using Stackelberg game. The four strategies (free strategy, subsidization strategy, carbon taxation strategy, subsidization and carbon taxation strategy) of premium and penalty mechanism are studied. The equilibrium values for CLSC member decisions are derived. Analytical results suggest that government should adopt the subsidization and carbon taxation strategy which can not only effectively reduce total carbon emissions, but also enhance recycling rate. Numerical results validate the conclusion, and further analyze the effects of subsidies and carbon taxes on the recycling rate, total carbon emissions and profits of CLSC.
  • Keywords
    air pollution control; game theory; pricing; recycling; supply chain management; CLSC; Stackelberg game; carbon taxation strategy; closed-loop supply chain; decentralized decision-making; free strategy; premium-and-penalty mechanism; pricing strategy; recycling rate; subsidization and carbon taxation strategy; subsidization strategy; total carbon emission reduction; Carbon dioxide; Carbon tax; Frequency modulation; Government; Pricing; Recycling; Supply chains; Closed-loop supply chain; Stackelberg game; premium and penalty mechanism; pricing strategy;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM), 2013 IEEE International Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Bangkok
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/IEEM.2013.6962541
  • Filename
    6962541