DocumentCode
694157
Title
Pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain based on premium and penalty mechanism
Author
Gao Juhong ; Wang Haiyan ; Han Hongshuai ; Hou Liting
Author_Institution
Sch. of Manage. & Econ., Tianjin Univ., Tianjin, China
fYear
2013
fDate
10-13 Dec. 2013
Firstpage
896
Lastpage
900
Abstract
This work analyzes the pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) based on premium and penalty mechanism under decentralized decision-making using Stackelberg game. The four strategies (free strategy, subsidization strategy, carbon taxation strategy, subsidization and carbon taxation strategy) of premium and penalty mechanism are studied. The equilibrium values for CLSC member decisions are derived. Analytical results suggest that government should adopt the subsidization and carbon taxation strategy which can not only effectively reduce total carbon emissions, but also enhance recycling rate. Numerical results validate the conclusion, and further analyze the effects of subsidies and carbon taxes on the recycling rate, total carbon emissions and profits of CLSC.
Keywords
air pollution control; game theory; pricing; recycling; supply chain management; CLSC; Stackelberg game; carbon taxation strategy; closed-loop supply chain; decentralized decision-making; free strategy; premium-and-penalty mechanism; pricing strategy; recycling rate; subsidization and carbon taxation strategy; subsidization strategy; total carbon emission reduction; Carbon dioxide; Carbon tax; Frequency modulation; Government; Pricing; Recycling; Supply chains; Closed-loop supply chain; Stackelberg game; premium and penalty mechanism; pricing strategy;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM), 2013 IEEE International Conference on
Conference_Location
Bangkok
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/IEEM.2013.6962541
Filename
6962541
Link To Document