Title :
Linear complementary dual code improvement to strengthen encoded circuit against hardware Trojan horses
Author :
Xuan Thuy Ngo ; Bhasin, Shivam ; Danger, Jean-Luc ; Guilley, Sylvain ; Najm, Zakaria
Author_Institution :
Inst. MINES-TELECOM, TELECOM ParisTech, Paris, France
Abstract :
Hardware Trojan Horses (HTH) are a serious threat to semiconductor industry with significant economic impact. We introduced in [10] a method called “encoded circuit”, which both prevents and detects HTH. We achieved this goal using Linear Complementary Dual (LCD) codes. In this paper, we achieve a lower overhead and a better tunability by using a Linear Complementary Pair (LCP) of codes, which are not necessarily dual. LCP have two security parameters dTrigger and dPayload, such that the knowledge of strictly less than dTrigger bits of the encoded state reveals no information about the actual state; in addition, any HTH which modifies strictly less than dPayload bits of encoded state, will produce an invalid codeword. The application on an 8-bit processor shows the improvement of the new LCP codes. We also show that it is possible to fully automate CAD flow to generate encoded circuits with LCP codes. Finally we encode a SIMON cryptographic co-processor and test its resistance against physical attacks like Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) and Fault Injection Analysis (FIA).
Keywords :
cryptography; invasive software; semiconductor industry; 8-bit processor; CAD flow; FIA; HTH; LCD code; LCP code; SCA; SIMON cryptographic co-processor; encoded state; fault injection analysis; hardware Trojan horse; linear complementary dual code; linear complementary pair; security parameters; semiconductor industry; side-channel analysis; strengthen encoded circuit; Decoding; Encoding; Hardware; Integrated circuits; Logic gates; Registers; Security; Dual distance; Encoding; Fault injection attack; Hardware Trojan Horses (HTH); Linear Complementary Dual (LCD) codes; Linear Complementary Pair (LCP) of codes; Minimal distance; Probing attack; Side-channel attack;
Conference_Titel :
Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2015 IEEE International Symposium on
Conference_Location :
Washington, DC
DOI :
10.1109/HST.2015.7140242