• DocumentCode
    724339
  • Title

    Coalition formation game of dual-identity nodes for improving PHY security of wireless networks

  • Author

    Hu Zhiling ; Wang Baoyun

  • Author_Institution
    Coll. of Commun. & Inf. Eng., Nanjing Univ. of Posts & Telecommun., Nanjing, China
  • fYear
    2015
  • fDate
    23-25 May 2015
  • Firstpage
    3658
  • Lastpage
    3662
  • Abstract
    In wireless communication, coalitional game theory has been a promising approach for analyzing cooperative networks to improve the physical layer security. In this paper, we propose a new model in which each user acts as a dual-identity node, a data source or a friendly jammer, and then formulize the cooperation problem based on the proposed model as a coalitional game. Furthermore, we propose a novel distributed algorithm based on “merge-and-split rules”, based on which the dual-identity nodes can mutually effect and cooperate into disjoint independent coalitions which can maximize the total secrecy capacity of all the users with a fixed power constraint. Finally, the coalitional structure is got and the validity of the proposed algorithm is verified by the simulation results as improving the secrecy capacity of each user comparing with the non-cooperative case. In addition, the self-adaption of the network´s topology is also studied.
  • Keywords
    cooperative communication; game theory; jamming; telecommunication network topology; telecommunication security; wireless channels; PHY security; coalition formation game; coalitional game theory; cooperative networks; data source; distributed algorithm; dual-identity nodes; fixed power constraint; friendly jammer; merge-and-split rules; network topology; noncooperative case; physical layer security; secrecy capacity; wireless communication; wireless networks; Cooperative systems; Games; Jamming; Physical layer; Relays; Security; Wireless communication; coalition game; dual-identity; eavesdropper; security capacity;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Control and Decision Conference (CCDC), 2015 27th Chinese
  • Conference_Location
    Qingdao
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-7016-2
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCDC.2015.7162560
  • Filename
    7162560