• DocumentCode
    726387
  • Title

    Investigation of obfuscation-based anti-reverse engineering for printed circuit boards

  • Author

    Guo, Z. ; Tehranipoor, M. ; Forte, D. ; Di, J.

  • Author_Institution
    Univ. of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
  • fYear
    2015
  • fDate
    8-12 June 2015
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    6
  • Abstract
    Prior work has shown that printed circuit board (PCB) reverse engineering can be accomplished with inexpensive home solutions as well as state-of-the-art technologies. Once the information of how components on a PCB are connected is determined, an adversary can steal the IP, clone the design, determine points of attack on a system, etc. Existing chip-level obfuscation techniques are not applicable to board level due to the significant differences between chips and PCBs. In this paper, we propose a PCB obfuscation approach that relies on permutation blocks to hide the interconnects among the PCB´s circuit components. A detailed framework is provided to implement the proposed approach and evaluate its performance. Potential attacks and countermeasures are also discussed. Results obtained from five industrial reference designs show that it is nearly impossible to break the proposed approach by brute force, even under pessimistic assumptions. Our investigation also reveals that PCBs containing a programmable component with 64 pins (or more) are well-protected by our approach, making it suitable for a large percentage of systems and applications.
  • Keywords
    performance evaluation; printed circuits; reverse engineering; IP; PCB circuit components; antireverse engineering; chip-level obfuscation techniques; performance evaluation; permutation blocks; pessimistic assumptions; printed circuit boards; programmable component; Boards; Hardware; Logic gates; Measurement; Ports (Computers); Reverse engineering; Software;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Design Automation Conference (DAC), 2015 52nd ACM/EDAC/IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    San Francisco, CA
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1145/2744769.2744862
  • Filename
    7167299