Mixed equilibrium (ME) for multiclass routing games

Author

Boulogne, Thomas ; Altman, Eitan ; Kameda, Hisao ; Pourtallier, Odile

Volume

47

Issue

6

fYear

2002

fDate

6/1/2002 12:00:00 AM

Firstpage

903

Lastpage

916

Abstract

We consider a network shared by noncooperative two types of users, group users and individual users. Each user of the first type has a significant impact on the load of the network, whereas a user of the second type does not. Both group users as well as individual users choose their routes so as to minimize their costs. We further consider the case that the users may have side constraints. We study the concept of mixed equilibrium (mixing of Nash equilibrium and Wardrop equilibrium). We establish its existence and some conditions for its uniqueness. Then, we apply the mixed equilibrium to a parallel links network and to a case of load balancing

Keywords

constraint theory; game theory; optimisation; telecommunication network routing; Nash equilibrium networks; Wardrop equilibrium; game theory; mixed equilibrium; multiclass routing games; network routing; noncooperative game; optimization; side constraints; uniqueness; Constraint theory; Costs; Distributed computing; Load management; Marine vehicles; Nash equilibrium; Roads; Routing; Telecommunication computing; Telecommunication traffic;

fLanguage

English

Journal_Title

Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions on

Publisher

ieee

ISSN

0018-9286

Type

jour

DOI

10.1109/TAC.2002.1008357

Filename

1008357