DocumentCode
767946
Title
Convex Bayes decision theory
Author
Stirling, Wynn C. ; Morrell, Darryl R.
Author_Institution
Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Brigham Young Univ., Provo, UT, USA
Volume
21
Issue
1
fYear
1991
Firstpage
173
Lastpage
183
Abstract
The basic concepts of Levi´s epistemic utility theory and credal convexity are presented. Epistemic utility, in addition to penalizing error as is done with traditional Bayesian decision methodology, permits a unit of informational value to be distributed among the hypotheses of a decision problem. Convex Bayes decision theory retains the conditioning structure of probability-based inference, but addresses many of the objections to Bayesian inference through relaxation of the requirement for numerically definite probabilities. The result is a decision methodology that stresses avoiding errors and seeks decisions that are likely to be highly informative as well as true. By relaxing the mandatory requirement for unique decisions and point estimates in all cases, decision and estimation criteria that do not demand more than is possible to obtain from the data and permit a natural man-in-the-loop interface are obtained. Applications are provided to illustrate the theory
Keywords
Bayes methods; decision theory; probability; Levi´s epistemic utility theory; convex Bayes decision theory; credal convexity; informational value; man-in-the-loop interface; penalizing error; probability-based inference; Bayesian methods; Cybernetics; Decision making; Decision theory; Humans; Information systems; Stress; User interfaces; Utility theory;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
0018-9472
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/21.101147
Filename
101147
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