Charge sensitive and incentive compatible end-to-end window-based control for selfish users

Author

Jin, Youngmi ; Kesidis, George

Author_Institution

Depts. of Electr. Eng. & Comput. Sci. & Eng., Pennsylvania State Univ., University Park, PA, USA

Volume

24

Issue

5

fYear

2006

fDate

5/1/2006 12:00:00 AM

Firstpage

952

Lastpage

961

Abstract

This paper considers the problem of finding a tamper-resistant and charge-sensitive end-to-end window flow-control mechanism for greedy users. Using a mathematical model of resource distribution, we propose a distributed window flow-control mechanism leading to a flow-rate vector which achieves maximum total utility. Desirable features of the proposed window control algorithm and properties of the equilibrium points are explored. We also prove the convergence of the proposed window control algorithm.

Keywords

game theory; incentive schemes; telecommunication congestion control; charge sensitive mechanism; end-to-end window flow control; flow-rate vector; incentive compatible pricing; resource distribution; selfish users; tamper-resistant protocol; Commercialization; Convergence; Game theory; Helium; Internet; Mathematical model; Pricing; Protocols; Resource management; Web sites; Game theory; incentive compatible pricing; optimization; selfish users; tamper-resistant protocol; window control;

fLanguage

English

Journal_Title

Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on

Publisher

ieee

ISSN

0733-8716

Type

jour

DOI

10.1109/JSAC.2006.872876

Filename

1626422