ارتباط سياسي، راهبري شركتي و تهور مالياتي

Political Connection, Corporate Governance and Tax Aggressiveness

هدف: اين پژوهش با هدف بررسي تأثير ارتباط سياسي و برخي از معيارهاي مهم راهبري شركتي ازجمله استقلال هيئت‌مديره و ميزان مالكيت سهامداران نهادي بر تهور مالياتي و همچنين، بررسي تأثير اين معيارها بر رابطه بين ارتباط سياسي و تهور مالياتي به اجرا درآمده است. روش: براي آزمون فرضيه‌هايپژوهش از الگوي داده‌هاي تركيبي و براي اندازه‌گيري متغير تهور مالياتي از تفاوت ماليات دفتري استفاده شده است. نمونۀ آماري اين پژوهش، پس از اعمال برخي محدوديت‌ها شامل 121 شركت پذيرفته شده در بورس اوراق‌بهادار تهران طي بازه زماني 1390 تا 1395 است. يافته‌ها: يافته‌هاي پژوهش حاكي از آن است كه برقراري ارتباط سياسي با دولت تأثير مثبت و معنادار و وجود اعضاء هيئت‌مديره مستقل و ميزان مالكيت سهامداران نهادي، تأثير منفي و معنادار بر تهور مالياتي دارند. همچنين اعضاء هيئت‌مديره مستقل و ميزان مالكيت سهامداران نهادي، رابطه مثبت بين ارتباط سياسي و تهور مالياتي را كاهش مي‌دهند. نتيجه‌گيري: با توجه به يافته‌هاي پژوهش مي‌توان دريافت كه شركت‌هاي داراي ارتباط سياسي با دولت به دليل برخورداري از مزايا و امتيازات دولتي، ميزان تهور مالياتي بيشتري دارند كه با استفاده از سازوكارهاي راهبري شركتي مانند وجود اعضاء هيئت‌مديره مستقل و ميزان مالكيت سهامداران نهادي مي‌توان ميزان تهور مالياتي را كاهش داد و از تأثير مثبت ارتباط سياسي بر تهور مالياتي كاست.

Objective: The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of political connection and some key corporate governance proxies, such as independence of the board of directors, institutional shareholders ownership on tax aggressiveness, and the impact of these proxies on the relationship between political connection and tax aggressiveness. Method: The panel data model was used to test and analyze the research hypotheses, and tax aggressiveness was measured by the difference between temporary and permanent book taxes. After applying some restrictions, 121 companies listed in the Tehran Stock Exchange were selected as the sample of the research in 2012-2017. Results: The findings of this study indicated that having a political connection with the government has positive and significant effects on tax aggressiveness, and that the existence of independent board of directors and the amount of institutional shareholders in the company have negative and significant effects on tax aggressiveness. Also, the findings showed that the independence of the board of directors and institutional shareholders reduce the positive relationship between political connection and tax aggressiveness. Conclusion: It can be concluded that because of the advanteges of having relationship with government, companies that have political connection with the government have a high level of tax aggressiveness that can be reduced by using corporate governance mechanisms such as independence of the board of directors and presence of institutional shareholders. These mechanisms may reduce the positive impact of political connection on tax aggressiveness.