قدرت مديران و لحن اعلان سود با تأكيد بر نقش نظارت هيئت مديره

CEO power and earnings announcement tone with emphasis on the role of board oversight

ﮔﺰارش ﺳﻮد ﯾﮑﯽ از ﻣﻬﻢﺗﺮﯾﻦ اﻃﻼﻋﺎﺗﯽ اﺳﺖ ﮐﻪ در اﺧﺘﯿﺎر ﺑﺎزار ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪ ﻗﺮار ﻣﯽﮔﯿﺮد. ﻣﺪﯾﺮان ﺑﺎ ﺗﺴﻠﻄﯽ ﮐﻪ ﺑﺮ ﺷﺮاﯾﻂ دارﻧﺪ ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﻨﺪ ﻧﻪﺗﻨﻬﺎ در ﮐﻤﯿﺖ ﺑﻠﮑﻪ در ﮐﯿﻔﯿﺖ اراﺋﻪ ﮔﺰارشﻫﺎ ﻧﯿﺰ ﻣﺪاﺧﻠﻪ ﻣﯽﻧﻤﺎﯾﻨﺪ، ﭘﺲ ﺳﻮد را ﺑﺎ ﻟﺤﻦ ﻣﺜﺒﺖﺗﺮي اﻋﻼن ﻣﯽﻧﻤﺎﯾﻨﺪ؛ اﻣﺎ ﻧﻈﺎرت از ﺟﺎﻧﺐ ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﻣﻨﺠﺮ ﺑﻪ ﺣﻔﺎﻇﺖ از ﻣﻨﺎﻓﻊ ﺳﻬﺎﻣﺪاران و ﮐﺎﻫﺶ ﻣﺸﮑﻼت ﻧﻤﺎﯾﻨﺪﮔﯽ ﻣﯽﮔﺮدد و ﺗﻤﺎﯾﻞ اﯾﻦ ﻣﺪﯾﺮان را ﺟﻬﺖ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از ﻟﺤﻦ ﺑﺎ اﻏﺮاق در اﻋﻼن ﺳﻮد ﻣﺤﺪود ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ؛ ﺑﻨﺎﺑﺮاﯾﻦ ﻫﺪف ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺣﺎﺿﺮ ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ راﺑﻄﻪ ﺑﯿﻦ ﻗﺪرت ﻣﺪﯾﺮان )ﺗﻮاﻧﻤﻨﺪي و دوﮔﺎﻧﻪ ﺑﻮدن ﻧﻘﺶ ﻣﺪﯾﺮ و ﭼﺮﺧﺶ ﻣﺪﯾﺮ( و ﻟﺤﻦ اﻋﻼن ﺳﻮد ﺑﺎ ﺗﺄﮐﯿﺪ ﺑﺮ ﻧﻘﺶ ﻧﻈﺎرت ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه )ﺗﻌﺪاد ﺟﻠﺴﺎت و درﺻﺪ اﻋﻀﺎي ﻏﯿﺮﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه( اﺳﺖ. در اﯾﻦ راﺳﺘﺎ ﻧﻤﻮﻧﻪاي ﻣﺸﺘﻤﻞ ﺑﺮ 107 ﺷﺮﮐﺖ ﭘﺬﯾﺮﻓﺘﻪﺷﺪه در ﺑﻮرس اوراق ﺑﻬﺎدار ﺗﻬﺮان، ﻃﯽ دوره زﻣﺎﻧﯽ 1396-1392 اﻧﺘﺨﺎب و آزﻣﻮن ﺷﺪه اﺳﺖ. ﻧﺘﺎﯾﺞ آزﻣﻮن ﻓﺮﺿﯿﻪﻫﺎ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﻪوﺳﯿﻠﻪ رﮔﺮﺳﯿﻮن ﭼﻨﺪﮔﺎﻧﻪ ﻧﺸﺎن ﻣﯽدﻫﺪ ﻗﺪرت ﻣﺪﯾﺮان ﺑﺎ ﻣﻌﯿﺎر ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﯾﯽ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺖ و ﭼﺮﺧﺶ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺖ ﺑﺎ ﻟﺤﻦ اﻋﻼن ﺳﻮد ﻣﺪﯾﺮان راﺑﻄﻪ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ و ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري دارد ﻫﻤﭽﻨﯿﻦ، درﺻﺪ اﻋﻀﺎي ﻏﯿﺮﻣﻮﻇﻒ ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﺳﺒﺐ ﺗﻀﻌﯿﻒ راﺑﻄﻪ ﺑﯿﻦ ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﯾﯽ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺖ در ﻟﺤﻦ ﻣﺜﺒﺖ اﻋﻼن ﺳﻮد ﻣﯽﺷﻮد اﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﺪاد ﺟﻠﺴﺎت ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﺑﺮ اﯾﻦ راﺑﻄﻪ اﺛﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﻧﺪارد. ﻫﻤﭽﻨﯿﻦ، ﻧﻈﺎرت ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﺑﺮ راﺑﻄﻪ ﭼﺮﺧﺶ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﻋﺎﻣﻞ ﺑﺎ ﻟﺤﻦ اﻋﻼن ﺳﻮد ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري ﻧﺪارد. ﻫﻤﭽﻨﯿﻦ، درﺻﺪ اﻋﻀﺎي ﻏﯿﺮﻣﻮﻇﻒ در ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﺑﺮ راﺑﻄﻪ دوﮔﺎﻧﮕﯽ ﻧﻘﺶ ﻣﺪﯾﺮﻋﺎﻣﻞ و ﻟﺤﻦ اﻋﻼن ﺳﻮد ﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ ﺗﻀﻌﯿﻒﮐﻨﻨﺪه و ﻣﻌﻨﺎداري دارد اﻣﺎ ﺗﻌﺪاد ﺟﻠﺴﺎت ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﺑﺮ اﯾﻦ راﺑﻄﻪ ﺑﯽﺗﺄﺛﯿﺮ اﺳﺖ. اﯾﻦ ﭘﮋوﻫﺶ ﺑﻪ ﻫﯿﺌﺖﻣﺪﯾﺮه ﺑﻪﻣﻨﻈﻮر اﻓﺰاﯾﺶ اﻧﻌﻄﺎفﭘﺬﯾﺮي ﻣﺎﻟﯽ و ﺟﻠﺐ ﻧﻈﺮ ﺳﺮﻣﺎﯾﻪﮔﺬاران ﮐﻤﮏ ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ ﺗﺎ ﺗﻮﺟﻪ وﯾﮋه ﺑﻪ ﻗﺪرت ﻣﺪﯾﺮﯾﺖ اﺟﺮاﯾﯽ داﺷﺘﻪ ﺑﺎﺷﻨﺪ.

The value of earnings reporting depends on the information it provides to the capital market. In the meantime, managers with the power and control of the situation interfere not only in quantity but also in the quality of reporting, so they declare profit in a more positive tone. However, supervisory management leads to protecting shareholder interests and reducing agency problems, limiting these managers' willingness to use an exaggerated tone in their earnings announcement. But in the absence of sufficient theoretical and empirical evidence in this area, the present study examines the relationship between the CEO power (CEO tenure, CEO duality & Manager's ability) and earnings announcement tone with emphasis on the role of board oversight (board meeting & Percentage of Non-Board Members). For this purpose, a sample of 109 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period 2013-2017 was tested. The results of the research hypothesis test by multiple regression show that earnings announcement tone is significantly positively associated with CEO tenure and Manager's ability. In addition, Percentage of Non-Board Members of directors weaker the relationship between management ability & earnings announcement tone, but board meetings have no significant effect on the relationship. In addition, board supervision did not have a significant effect on the relationship between CEO tenure and earnings tone. The non-Board Members have a significant effect on the relationship between CEO's duality and earnings tone, but the number of board meetings has no effect on this relationship. This research helps the board to increase financial flexibility and attract investors' attention to the power of executive management.