چيستي فهم از نظر ويتگنشتاين و ارزيابي خوانش مكداول از آن

Wittgenstein's View of What Understanding Is and Examining McDowell's Reading of It

از ﻧﻈﺮ وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ ﻓﻬﻢ اﻣﺮي ذﻫﻨﯽ ﻧﯿﺴﺖ. اﻣﺎ اﯾﻦ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﺑﺎ اﻋﺘﺮاﺿﯽ ﺑﺎ ﻧﺎم »اﻋﺘﺮاض ﻋﻠﻤﯽ« روﺑﺮو ﻣﯽﺷﻮد ﮐﻪ ﮔﻮﯾﯽ ﻓﯿﻠﺴﻮف ﺟﺎﯾﮕﺎه ﻋﺼﺐﺷﻨﺎس ﯾﺎ رواﻧﺸﻨﺎس را ﻏﻀﺐ ﮐﺮده اﺳﺖ. در اﯾﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﻧﺸﺎن ﻣﯽدﻫﯿﻢ ﮐﻪ وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ ﺟﺎﯾﮕﺎه ﻋﻠﻢ را ﻏﻀﺐ ﻧﮑﺮده اﺳﺖ و ﺗﻨﻬﺎ اﯾﻦ ادﻋﺎ ﮐﻪ ﻋﻠﻢ ﻣﯽﺗﻮاﻧﺪ ﮔﺰارﺷﯽ ﭘﯿﺸﯿﻨﯽ از ﻓﻬﻢ ﺑﻪدﺳﺖ ﺑﺪﻫﺪ را اﻧﮑﺎر ﻣﯽﮐﻨﺪ. در ﺧﻮاﻧﺶ ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ ﻧﻈﺮ وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ، ﻓﻬﻢ ﺑﻪ ﻣﺜﺎﺑﻪ ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﯾﯽ در ﻧﻈﺮ ﮔﺮﻓﺘﻪ ﻣﯽﺷﻮد. اﻣﺎ اﯾﻦ ﻧﮑﺘﻪ ﺑﺎ اﯾﻦ اﻣﺮ ﮐﻪ ﮔﻮﯾﯽ ﻓﻬﻢ در ﯾﮏ ﻟﺤﻈﻪ اﺗﻔﺎق ﻣﯽاﻓﺘﺪ در ﺗﻀﺎد اﺳﺖ و ﺑﺮاي ﻫﻤﯿﻦ در اﯾﻦ ﻣﻘﺎﻟﻪ ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﻓﻬﻢ ﻫﻤﭽﻮن »آﻏﺎز ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﯾﯽ« ﮐﻪ ﻫﻢ ﻓﻬﻢ را در ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﺑﺎ ﺗﻮاﻧﺎﯾﯽ در ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﯽﮔﯿﺮد و ﻫﻢ رﺧﺪادن آن را در ﻟﺤﻈﻪ ﻣﻤﮑﻦ ﻣﯽداﻧﺪ ﺗﻮﺿﯿﺢ ﻣﯽدﻫﯿﻢ. ﺑﺎ اﯾﻨﺤﺎل ﻧﻔﯽ اﻣﺮ ذﻫﻨﯽ ﺑﻮدن ﻓﻬﻢ، ﻣﻮﺿﻌﯽ ﺿﺪ واﻗﻊﮔﺮاﯾﺎﻧﻪ درﺑﺎره ﻓﻬﻢ را ﺑﻪ وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ ﻧﺴﺒﺖ ﻣﯽدﻫﺪ. ﺑﺮاي ﻫﻤﯿﻦ ﺑﺎ ﮐﻤﮏ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﮏداول از وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ ﺳﻌﯽ ﻣﯽﮐﻨﯿﻢ ﻧﺸﺎن دﻫﯿﻢ ﮐﻪ وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ در داﺧﻞ ﺑﺎزي زﺑﺎن ﻓﻬﻢ را ﻫﻤﭽﻮن ﯾﮏ ﺣﺎﻟﺖ ذﻫﻨﯽ ﻣﻌﯿﻦ در ﻧﻈﺮ ﻣﯽﮔﯿﺮد. ﮔﺮﭼﻪ ﺗﻔﺴﯿﺮ ﻣﮏداول ﺑﺎ ﺑﺮﺧﯽ از ﻧﮑﺎت وﯾﺘﮕﻨﺸﺘﺎﯾﻦ ﺑﻪﺧﺼﻮص در ﮐﺘﺎب ﺑﺮﮔﻪﻫﺎ در ﺗﻀﺎد اﺳﺖ.

Understanding is not matter of mind in Wittgenstein view. But this position is met with a protest called "scientific objection" as if the philosopher is simply ruling out something that neurologist or psychologist could discover. In this article we show that Wittgenstein did not resent the position of science and only denies the claim that science can provide an a priori account of understanding. In the general reading of Wittgenstein's view, understanding is seen as an ability. But this is at odds with the fact that understanding happens in an instant, and that is why we explained in this article the position of understanding is like the "beginning of ability" which considers both understanding in relation to ability and its occurrence. However, the denial of the subjectivity of understanding attributes an anti-realist stance on understanding to Wittgenstein. Therefore, with the help of McDowell's interpretation of Wittgenstein, we try to show that Wittgenstein considers the linguistic understanding as a certain state of mind in the language game. McDowell's interpretation, however, contradicts some of Wittgenstein's points, especially in Zettel.