كليدواژه :
آگاثون , خير كلي , خير بما هو خير , متافيزيكِ خير , معناي مشترك , خير في‌نفسه , معناي اصلي
چكيده فارسي :
ارسطو در پژوهش عملي به اقتضاي غايتش (خير غايي) به مفهوم «آگاثون» يا «خير كلي» مي پردازد. گستره دلالت و استعمال مقولي خير همچون موجود (هستنده) است. از اين رو وي به تامل نظري در خير، و مقايسه آن با موجود به نحو مطلق مي پردازد. در سير تحليل ارسطو از مفهوم «آگاثون»، مي توان هم هنگام پرسش از امكان برساختن متافيزيكي را در باب خير با موضوع خير بما هو خير همسان با متافيزيك وجود و موضوع موجود بما هو موجود پي گرفت. در اين سير، آشكار مي شود كه هرچند «موجود» و «خير» گستره دلالت واژگاني و اطلاق مقولي همساني دارند اما ساختار ارجاعي و اشتراك معنايي يكساني ندارند. دلالت هاي گوناگون موجود به يك معناي مشترك نخستين، و مقولات متعددش به يك مقوله اصلي باز مي گردد. اين معنا و مقوله اصلي و اوليه، موجود نخستين و مقوله جوهر است و دانش متافيزيك وجود به عنوان دانايي نخستين به علت تقويم موضوع آن (موجود نخستين) شكل مي گيرد. اما ميان دلالت هاي گوناگون خير هيچ معناي مشتركي وجود ندارد و خير در هر مقوله به نحوي مستقل و بي ارتباط با ساير معاني و مقولات به كار مي رود. فقدان معناي مشترك اوليه و مقوله اصلي كه همه معاني و مقولات ديگر بدان بازگردند، مانع از تقويم موضوع مطلق خير و حيث ذاتي بما هو خير مي شود. از اين رو نمي توان همسان با موجود براي خير، متافيزيكي تصور كرد با موضوع خير بما هو خير، كه با نحوه نگرش نظري محضي همچون سوفيا در دانايي نخستين شناخته شود. در برابر امتناع تقويم ايدوس (صورت) و فهم ايدتيك (صورت انديش) از خير كه شرط تكوين دانش نظري است، ارسطو با نفي ايده خير و نگرش ديالكتيك افلاطوني، حيث كلي و نظري خير را رها كرده و به خير انساني معطوف به تحقق عملي آن (خيري كه انسان در عمل مي تواند به دست آورد) مي پردازد و در ادامه طرح واره اي از آن معطوف به تحقق عملي ترسيم مي كند.
چكيده لاتين :
Practical research, according to Aristotle, strives to actualize the Supreme Good as the ultimate end of life. The Final Good could be determined if preceded by an outline based on conceptual analysis. For this reason, Aristotle considers agathón (ἀγαθόν), as the universal concept of good, and clarifies its conceptual-categorical structure to explain how we can understand it. In virtue of the similarity between good and existences for their extension of senses (good has as many meanings as existences), Aristotle proceeds to analyze good compared to existence as an absolute philosophical conception. Alongside his comparative study of good and existence, we can consider a metaphysics for good similar to the metaphysics of being and question its possibility. Corresponding to the metaphysics of existence that considers being qua being, one can imagine a metaphysics for good that investigates goodness qua goodness and explores its philosophical characteristics and theoretical attributes aimed at the question of its possibility.
It appears, in the process of Aristotle’s analysis that there is a common meaning and central definite characteristic in several significations and different categories of being by reference to one starting point: the primary being or substance. From the categorical point of view, similarly, various categories are accidental qualities of the fundamental category of substance. Because of the one principle of the primary being or substance, a metaphysics for being which contemplates on being qua being would be possible.
But good, on the contrary, is used homonymously in various different senses without any common meaning and with no reference to one principle. Of the categorical attitude, good is applied in any individual category independently with no connection with each other and by no reference to one main category. There is not, in fact, any category of primary good or substantial good which constitutes universal meaning and a single category as an appropriate subject matter for the intended knowledge of the metaphysics of good. Consequently, it is not possible to establish one primary philosophy for goodness qua goodness in the same way as the first philosophy of being as being.
Knowledge, according to Aristotle, is composed of the eidos (form or essence) as a universal absolute subject and eidetic attitude as a necessary theoretical way of understanding. Eidetic view and eidos entity are based on the common meaning and single principle which are not found in the concept of good. Thus, the theoretical approach to good, which could not constitute the eidos of good and eidetic knowledge, leads to the Platonic Idea of good and the dialectical attitude. But Aristotle who does not follow dialectic, cannot obtain the eidetic path to goodness either, and, therefore, reconstructs good as the well-being which is the final good that humankind can obtain practically. So he goes on to outline good not as the good in itself which in essence necessitates theoretical cognition, but as a final good of human life that is a condition that entails practical realization.
