عنوان به زبان ديگر :
The Impact of Audit Quality, Competitive Environment and Corporate Governance on Managers 'Unethical Behaviors: with Emphasis on Two Dimensions of Decision-making Horizon and Type of Forecast in Managers' Behavior
كليدواژه :
كيفيت حسابرسي , راهبري شركتي , محيط رقابتي شركت , رفتار خوش‌بينانه مديران و رفتار كوته‌بينانه مديران
چكيده فارسي :
هدف: اين پژوهش، در حوزه راهبري شركتي و مالي رفتاري قرار دارد. مطابق با موضوع مطرح شده اين استدلال وجود دارد كه سطح نظارت و رقابت، با افزايش سطح كيفيت افشا و سطح شفافيت سبب محدوديت در رفتارهاي غيراخلاقي مديران مي‌شود.
روش: مطابق اين هدف، با توجه به تئوري‌هاي متفاوت مطرح شده، شش فرضيه تدوين و داده‌هاي مالي مرتبط با 155 شركت بورسي براي دوره زماني سال‌هاي 1387 تا 1396 مورد تجزيه و تحليل قرار گرفت. در اين پژوهش، براي تجزيه و تحليل آزمون فرضيه‌هاي پژوهش از الگوي رگرسيوني چند متغيره استفاده شده است. روش پژوهش با استفاده از روش داده‌هاي تابلويي با رويكرد داده‌هاي تلفيقي و استفاده از روش رگرسيون لوجستيك آزمون شد.
يافته‌ها: يافته‌هاي پژوهش نشان داد كه كيفيت حسابرسي تأثير منفي و معناداري بر رفتارهاي غيراخلاقي مديريت دارد و سبب محدوديت در رفتارهاي فرصت طلبانه مديريت مي‌شود. همچنين، نتايج مويد آن است كه راهبري شركتي با افزايش توان نظارتي شركت سبب كاهش و محدوديت در رفتارهاي غيراخلاقي مديريت خواهد شد. افزون بر اين، نتايج بيانگر آن است كه محيط رقابتي شركت اثر معناداري بر رفتارهاي غيراخلاقي مديريت ندارد.
نتيجه‌گيري: مطابق با تئوري نمايندگي اين استدلال وجود دارد كه منافع مديران الزاماً با منافع ساير ذينفعان هم راستا نيست و مديران همواره در تلاش براي حداكثرسازي منافع خود هستند. از سوي ديگر، مكانيزم‌هاي نظارتي در اختيار ساير ذينفعان براي محدود ساختن رفتارهاي غيراخلاقي مديران است. نتايج بدست آمده از اين پژوهش نيز اين استدلال را حمايت مي‌كند كه مكانيزم‌هاي نظارتي سبب محدوديت در رفتارهاي فرصت طلبانه مديريت مي‌شود چرا كه اين مكانيزم‌ها شفافيت را ارتقا بخشيده و مديران را ملزم به رعايت اخلاق در پيش‌بيني‌ها و تصميمات استراتژيك شركت مي‌كند. از سوي ديگر، يافته‌ها نشان دهنده آن است كه مكانيزم رقابت در ايران اثري بر كنترل رفتارهاي فرصت‌طلبانه مديريت ندارد.
چكيده لاتين :
Objective: This research is in the field of corporate governance and behavioral finance. Conflicts of interest between directors and shareholders create agency costs for shareholders' equity that are borne by shareholders. Two sources of this conflict are managerial optimism and managerial myopia. Managerial optimism is favorable if it is about the manager's personal ability or about market conditions, but entrepreneurs and executives are often hurt by optimism bias. On the othe hand, myopic managers avoid spending on activities that benefit the company in the long run, such as research and development, because of their attitudes toward short-term profits or other factors such as short-term institutional investors. Expenditures in research and development activities are serious drivers of innovation in the company that contribute to the company's competitive advantages and sustainable economic development. Accordingly, there is an argument that in the country's economic environment, regulatory stimuli including corporate governance, audit quality and competitive environment of the company can create transparency and effective supervision to cause a fundamental limit on managers' unethical behaviors such as myopic and optimistic behaviors.
Methods: for this purpose, According to different considered theories, six hypotheses are developed and data on 155 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the period between the years 2008 to 2017 are analyzed. In this study, a multivariate regression model has been used to analyze the test of research hypotheses. The research method using Panel data method with fixed effects approach and using logistic regression are tested.
Results: Findings showed that audit quality has a negative and significant effect on unethical behaviors of management and causes limitations in opportunistic behaviors of management. There is an argument that audit quality has a positive and significant effect on the quality of disclosure. Therefore, the higher the audit quality, the more accurate the estimates and monitoring. Also, the results confirm that corporate governance will reduce and limit unethical management behaviors by increasing the company's supervisory capacity. Stronger corporate governance, by closely monitoring and controlling managerial behavior and decisions, is a limiting factor in managerial biased behaviors and reduces overly optimistic and myopic behaviors. Managers of competing companies compete fiercely to maintain market confidence, and these managers try to gain more market trust with accurate predictions. Despite prediction based on theoretical backgrounf, the results indicate that the company's competitive environment has no significant effect on unethical management behaviors.
Conclusion: According to agency theory, there is an argument that the interests of managers are not necessarily in line with the interests of other stakeholders, and managers are always trying to maximize their interests. On the other hand, regulatory mechanisms are at the disposal of other stakeholders to limit the unethical behavior of managers. The results of this study also support the argument that regulatory mechanisms limit the opportunistic behaviors of management because these mechanisms promote transparency and require managers to observe ethics in predictions and strategic decisions. On the other hand, the findings show that the competition mechanism in Iran has no effect on controlling opportunistic management behaviors.
