كليدواژه :
محافظه‌كاري در گزارشگري مالي , پاداش عملكرد مديران , نظريه نمايندگي , عدم تقارن اطلاعاتي
چكيده فارسي :
هدف: هدف اين پژوهش بررسي ارتباط بين محافظه‌كاري در گزارشگري مالي و حساسيت پاداش مديران و نيز شناسايي تأثير محافظه‌كاري در گزارشگري مالي بر كارآيي قراردادهاي جبران خدمت مديران انجام شده است.
روش: جامعه آماري پژوهش از طريق روش هدفمند براي دوره زماني 1390 لغايت 1398، 104 شركت مي‌باشد و با استفاده از رگرسيون چندمتغيره روابط بين متغيرهاي پژوهش مورد آزمون قرار گرفتند.
يافته‌ها: نتايج پژوهش نشان مي‌دهد محافظه‌كاري با سطح پاداش مديران و همچنين حساسيت پاداش مديران داراي رابطه منفي و معناداري است. همچنين بين اثر تعاملي عملكرد حسابداري واقعي و محافظه‌كاري با سطح پاداش مديران رابطه معناداري وجود ندارد. هر چند بين اثر تعاملي محافظه‌كاري و حساسيت عملكرد حسابداري واقعي مبتني بر ارزش دفتري با حساسيت عملكرد-پاداش مديران رابطه مثبت و معناداري وجود دارد. نتايج حاكي از آن است كه بين اثر تعاملي بازده سهام و محافظه‌كاري با سطح پاداش مديران رابطه مثبت و معناداري وجود دارد. همچنين بين اثر تعاملي محافظه‌كاري و تغيير بازده سهام با حساسيت عملكرد پاداش مديران مبتني بر ارزش بازار رابطه مثبت و معناداري وجود دارد.
نتيجه‌گيري: نتايج پژوهش نشان مي‌دهد محافظه‌كاري در گزارشگري مالي مي‌تواند ريسك اطلاعاتي و مسئله نمايندگي را كاهش دهد. از اين‌رو مي‌توان محافظه‌كاري در گزارشگري مالي را به‌عنوان يك مكانيزم قراردادي كارآمد كه مي‌تواند رفتارهاي فرصت‌طلبانه مديران را محدود نمايد، قلمداد كرد. اگر سهامداران، متقاضي محافظه‌كاري به‌عنوان يك سازوكار حاكميتي هستند، بايد ميزان محافظه‌كاري را بالاتر ببرند كه اين خود موجب افزايش حساسيت پاداش مديران خواهد شد؛ بدين معنا كه محافظه‌كاري در گزارشگري مالي مي‌تواند كارايي قراردادهاي مديران را بهبود بخشد.
چكيده لاتين :
Objective: Separating ownership and management creates the problem of agency. Consequently, this information asymmetry between managers and shareholders brings the need for a conservative approach in financial reporting. In this way, shareholders use this approach to mitigate the effects of this information asymmetry. Hence, this study aims to investigate the relationship between conservatism in financial reporting and the sensitivity of compensation performance of managers. Also, this study identifies and examine the effect of conservatism in financial reporting on the effectiveness of the executive manager's compensation contracts in the Iran setting.
Method: The research population selected through the systematic elimination method. The study population consists of 104 Iranian companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) during the years 2011 to 2019. Research hypotheses and links between variables tested using the panel data. Also, the multivariate regression model is used for hypothesis testing.
Results: The results indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship between conservatism in financial reporting and the level and sensitivity of executive manager's compensation. Also, results show no significant relationship between the interactive effect of the true performance of accounting and conservatism in financial reporting with the compensation-performance level of executive's managers. Findings show there is a positive and significant relationship between the interactive effect of conservatism and the sensitivity of the true performance of accounting based on book value with the sensitivity of executive manager's compensation. The results indicate that there is a positive and significant relationship between the interaction effect of stock returns and conservatism with the level of managers' compensation. There is also a positive and significant relationship between the interaction effect of conservatism and changes in stock returns with the sensitivity of managers' compensation-performance based on market value. Information asymmetry leads to conservatism in financial reporting as a solution to reduce the cost of agency. Hence, corporate financial reporting stakeholders demand conservatism to reduce agency costs by reducing information asymmetry and facilitate corporate governance.
Conclusion: The results of the current study extend the knowledge of previous studies. The results of this study indicate that conservatism in financial reporting can be effective in reducing information risks and the problems of agency. Therefore, conservatism in financial reporting can be considered an effective contractual mechanism. Accordingly, conservatism can limit the opportunistic behaviors of executive managers. Conservatism in financial reporting allows firms to CEO compensation more closely to corporate performance. Also, shareholders consider conservatism as a governance mechanism. They should increase the level of conservatism to increase the performance-compensation sensitivity of executives. Hence, conservatism in financial reporting is a tool that a board of directors can use to monitor and control CEOs' investment decisions; therefore, high-quality accounting information leads to increased investment efficiency by eliminating information asymmetry between managers and investors.
Based on the results of this study, we propose to use a conservative mechanism in financial reporting to protect the interests of shareholders against the opportunism of managers in an economic environment such as Iran, in which the state affects the economy. This paper is the first study of its type in Iran.
corporate financial reporting stakeholders demand conservatism to reduce agency costs by reducing information asymmetry and facilitate corporate governance.
Conclusion: The results of the current study extend the knowledge of previous studies. The results of this study indicate that conservatism in financial reporting can be effective in reducing information risks and the problems of agency. Therefore, conservatism in financial reporting can be considered an effective contractual mechanism. Accordingly, conservatism can limit the opportunistic behaviors of executive managers. Conservatism in financial reporting allows firms to CEO compensation more closely to corporate performance. Also, shareholders consider conservatism as a governance mechanism. They should increase the level of conservatism to increase the performance-compensation sensitivity of executives. Hence, conservatism in financial reporting is a tool that a board of directors can use to monitor and control CEOs' investment decisions; therefore, high-quality accounting information leads to increased investment efficiency by eliminating information asymmetry between managers and investors.
Based on the results of this study, we propose to use a conservative mechanism in financial reporting to protect the interests of shareholders against the opportunism of managers in an economic environment such as Iran, in which the state affects the economy. This paper is the first study of its type in Iran.
