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A Yew on Strawsonʹs "Descriptive Metaphysics"

The present paper has been made up of three main parts. First part begins with a question on which the whole structure of the paper has been based. The question is that "whether Strawsonʹs Descriptive Metaphysics is a doctrine or not?." It seems that some difficulties in correct understanding of Descriptive Metaphysics and the quality of its relation to Revisionary Metaphy ics arise when we consider Descriptive Metaphysics as a doctrine. Investigation about this problem goes on with the question that "how does Descriptive Metaphysics describe our general conceptual structures and their interconnexion?." In the second part, we show that Strawson describes them via connective linguistic analysis. Therefore, we "through determining the nature of Strawsonʹs analytical approach and charting itʹs relation to the question "how does analysis require metaphysics?".attempt to bring an evidence in order to prove our claim that "Descriptive Metaphysics is not a doctrine, but it is an analytical approach to proposed metaphysical problemes and doctrines in every epoch and society Drawing the conclusion and proving the above - mentioned claim in the third part, we refer to some questions and ambiguities which may be distract our claim. The most important of them is the question that "if Descriptive Metaphysics is not a doctrine, why Strawson makes inquiry into structural elements and their interconnexion?." Ultimately, we complete our claim by answering that question.