بررسي تاثير مديران غير موظف و سرمايه گذاران نهادي در رفتار مديريت سود (مديريت سود مبتني بر مدل آستانه)

The Investigation of Relationship Between Outside Directorsand Institutional Investors with Earnings Management Behavior(Tehran Stock Exchange)

This study examines earning management behavior and its relation with monitoring device of corporate governance. We are exploring to identify whether outside directors and institutional investors can restrict opportunistic earning management behavior? Earning management behavior is described by threshold model and Denotes bring up reported earning to target earnings levels. It consists income-increasing earning management and income-decreasing earning management, the proxy of earning management is abnormal working capital accruals. Our empirical tests are conducted by regression analysis using data 185 listed firms with fiscal years 1382-1385, and pooling time series and cross-section data. Result of signalling rationale that is tested using a logistic regression indicates that abnormal accruals cannot explains future earning changes, And be as signal for future earnings. Moreover, examining the link between monitoring device of corporate governance and earning management that is tested with pooled OLS regression shows, when managers will seek to manipulate earnings (upwards or downward). There is little evidence that outside directors and institutional investors Influence abnormal accruals. At last , we find no evidence that monitoring device can restrict aggressive earning management behavior. only when pre-managed earning are below last periodʹs reported earning, outside directors influence little the likelihood that reported earnings exceed the thresholds.