كاربرد نظريه ي فيرون در بررسي پايداري اوپك : با رويكرد نظريه ي بازي هاي تكراري

An Application of Fearonʹs Theory to Consider OPEC5s Stability: Through a Repeated Game Approach

In this paper, we present a simple version of Fleuronʹs bargaining and enforcement model and show that impatience (as captured in the discount factor) can be a source of bargaining strength. The outcome of the bargaining phase is followed by an enforcement phase that resembles a prisonersʹ dilemma. Second, we illustrate how to apply this model to the question of the distribution of benefits within the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), particularly with regard to the relationship between bargaining strength and disparate time horizons. We use empirical evidence from OPECʹs fifty year history to test the model. We find countries that discount the future more heavily tend to ask for higher oil production quotas than those that do not. Empirical evidence confirms that OPEC members who are in greater need of oil income are allowed to have higher relative quotas.