تعيين قيمت و مدت زمان تحويل در يك زنجيره‌ي تامين غير متمركز در محيط رقابتي

PRICE AND LEAD-TIME STUDY IN A DECENTRALIZED SUPPLY CHAIN UNDER COMPETITION

در اين نوشتار يك زنجيره‌ي تامين دو‌سطحي ، شامل يك توليد‌كننده و تعدادي تامين‌كننده كه با تقاضاي حساس به قيمت و مدت زمان تحويل مواجه‌اند، مورد مطالعه قرار مي‌گيرد. براي تجزيه و تحليل تصميم‌گيري درباه‌ي قيمت و مدت زمان تحويل توسط توليد‌كننده (به‌عنوان پيشرو ) و تامين‌كنندگان (به‌عنوان پسرو )، از بازي استكلبرگ استفاده مي‌شود. سپس به‌منظور تعيين قيمت و مدت زمان تحويل توسط تامين‌كنندگان تحت شرايط رقابت افقي، از مفهوم نقطه‌ي تعادل نش استفاده شده است. هدف هر شركت انتخاب بهترين قيمت و مدت زمان تحويل برنامه‌‌ريزي‌شده است، به‌گونه‌يي كه سود عملياتي آن شركت بيشينه شود. در ادامه، با استفاده از مطالعات عددي چگونگي تاثيرگذاري ويژگي‌هاي متفاوت بازار و شركت‌ها بر رقابت تعيين قيمت و مدت زمان تحويل نشان داده مي‌شود.

In this paper, we study a two-echelon supply chain containing a manufacturer and a number of suppliers who face price and lead time sensitive demand. We use the Stackelberg game for the manufacturer as the leader, and the suppliers as followers. Since making decisions about price and lead time at the supply level is, simultaneously, under horizontal competition, we use the Nash Equilibrium. We assume that custom demand depends on manufacturing price. The proportion of demand the manufacturer assigns to each supplier is dependent on its price and scheduled lead time. The objective of each supplier is to choose the best price and lead time to maximize his/her functional profit. In today’s competitive market, price and lead time are two important factors for the success of a company, and many companies use a short lead time as a marketing weapon to have more customers. Price and lead time are also highly interdependent, and some customers are willing to pay higher prices for shorter lead time. So, assessing the impacts of pricing and time performance strategies on demand, and the impacts of capacity decisions and issues related to company operations on these strategies, is very important. In this problem, we use the multiplicative competitive interaction function to model the market share by considering price and scheduled lead time. At first, the manufacturerʹs optimal response is obtained, with regard to the response of the suppliers, and then the decision will be made at the suppliers’ level. We prove that there is a unique Nash equilibrium for the price and scheduled lead time of suppliers that is obtained by using an iterative algorithm. By numerical study, we will examine the impact of different market characteristics on the price and scheduled lead time determined by each supplier. The impact of the supplier’s decision on that of the manufacturer, and its sensitivity analysis, with respect to the market situation, are also analyzed.