The Saying/Showing Distinction in Early Wittgenstein and Its Implications

In this paper, I shall try to clarify the saying/showing distinetion and to emphasize the role of this distinction in constructing a coherent picture of language and the world. In order to properly understand the differences between the sayable and the showable, I will throw light on the limits of language and the world. I will explain why it is impossible to say the showable and why it leads to non-sense. I will elucidate the relation between mysticism and the saying/showing distinction and show that both of them are better understood in light of Wittgensteinʹs solipsism. I will explain how Wittgensteinʹstranscendental solipsism is different from classical solipsism and how the former leads to pure realism. At several points, I will use the Kantian framework to explain Wittgenstemʹs view, especially whenjustifying Wittgensteinʹs realism.