عالم ميانه در مكتب اشراق و فلسفه‌هاي وحدت وجودي

Intermediate World in Illuminative Philosophy and the Philosophies of the Oneness of Being

اين مقاله با عنايت به نكته‌يي از هانري كربن درباره حكمت سهروردي به اين مطلب ميپردازد كه مباحث ناظر بر عالم ميانه در فلسفه‌هايي يافت ميشود كه بنوعي وحدت سنخي ميان همه مراتب هستي قايل باشند. از اينرو اگر در انديشه مثلاً سهروردي نتوانيم چنين وحدت سنخي را ميان جهان نور و جهان ظلمت بيابيم، هر چند كه او بنوعي بنيانگذار يا احيا كننده مسايل ناظر بر عالم ميانه هم باشد اما، نظام هستي‌شناسي او به ما اجازه نخواهد داد كه عالم ميانه را داخل در بنياد هستي‌شناسي او بدانيم و اين خود حاكي از آنست كه در تفكر او ثنويت سنخي در قلمرو هستي باقي است. نقش عالم ميانه تنها افزودن عالمي به ساير عوالم نيست، بلكه آنست كه دو جهان ديگر را به يكديگر آنچنان پيوند دهد كه جهان مادون، تا حدّ ممكن، برخوردار از احكام و اوصاف جهان مافوق گردد و بدين ترتيب نوعي وحدت سنخي منظور گردد. بايد توجه داشت كه چنين نقشي مقتضاي برزخيت چنين عالمي است. بر همين اساس، بررسي شواهدي از فلسفه شيخ اشراق نشان ميدهد كه تلقي هانري كربن از حكمت سهروردي بعنوان حكمتي ناظر بر عالم ميانه يا بتعبير خود او حكمت مبتني بر خيال... كه روش فلسفي را دگرگون ميكند و از ميان آري و نه ميگذرد، در صورتي صحيح خواهد بود كه طرح عالم ميانه موجب نفوذ و شمول واقعيت جهان برتر در باطن ذات جهان پست‌تر گردد، حال آنكه ثنويت سنخي جهان نور و جهان ظلمت مجال چنين تصويري از هستي‌شناسي سهروردي بدست نميدهد. در همين راستا، با تذكر اجمالي هستي‌شناسي ابن عربي، دواني، و ملاصدرا، بعنوان اَشكالي از وحدت وجود در سنت فلسفه اسلامي فرض تحقق عالم ميانه را در هر كدام مورد توجه قرار خواهيم داد، البته با اين پيش فرض كه بنا بگفته خود ملاصدرا تفاوتي ميان وحدت تشكيكي او و وحدت شخصي ابن عربي وجود ندارد.

Based on a quotation from Henry Corbin about Suhrawardi’s philosophy, the writer of this paper argues that the issues related to the intermediate world are found in philosophies that believe in a kind of oneness among all levels of being. Accordingly, if we fail to observe such a typical unity between the worlds of light and darkness in the philosophy of, for example, Suhrawardi, even if, in a way, we consider him to be the founder or reviver of the issues related to the intermediate world, we will never be allowed to place the intermediate world at the basis of his ontological system. This indicates that in his philosophy a kind of duality remains in the realm of being. The role of the intermediate world is not simply to add a world to other worlds. Rather, it is to unite the other two worlds so tightly with each other that the lower world attains the principles and attributes of the higher world as much as possible, and, in this way, a kind of unity is established. Of course, we must pay attention that such a role is necessitated by the intermediary nature of this world. Accordingly, available evidence in Suhrawardi’s philosophy indicates that Henry Corbin’s interpretation of Suhrawardi’s philosophy as a school based on the intermediate world, or, in his own words, based on imagination, which has created a revolution in philosophical methodology and is between ‘yes’ and ‘no’, will be correct only if propounding this world causes the penetration and inclusion of the reality of the higher world into the innermost of the essence of the lower world. However, the duality of the worlds of light and darkness does not allow the portrayal of such a picture from Suhrawardi’s ontology. In line with this discussion, the writer, after a brief reference to the ontologies of Ibn Arabi, Dawani, and Mulla Sadra, will deal with the assumption of the realization of the intermediate world in each of them as an objection to the oneness of being in Islamic philosophy. Nevertheless, it is presupposed that, according to Mulla Sadra himself, there is no difference between his gradational unity and Ibn Arabi’s partial unity.