جستجوي نخستين بارقه‌هاي تجرّد قوه خيال در حكمت سينوي

The Exploration of the First Flashes of the Abstraction of the Imaginative Faculty in Avicennanian Philosophy

رويكرد ابن‌سينا به قوه خيال و ادراكات مخزون در آن ناسازگار مي‌نمايد. در اين مقاله با تفكيك بين رويكردهاي متفاوت وي به تبيين اين ناسازگاري پرداخته شده است. شيخ در گام اول بر اساس مباني تفكر مشايي و تمسك به فرايند تجريد معرفتي در تحصيل ادراكات نفس، تمايز و تشخص ادراكات جزيي خيالي را مستلزم وجود ماده و قابليت در آن‌ها مي‌داند و به مادّيتِ صرف ادراكات خيالي و مخزن آن‌ها معتقد مي‌شود. وي در رويكرد دوم با ترديد جدي، به بررسي مادّيتِ ادراكات خيالي مي‌پردازد و اذعان مي‌كند كه صور خيالي نبايد جسماني باشند، وگرنه با تغيير و تحولِ اعضا و مخزن اين صور، يعني قوه خيال، دچار تغيير مي‌شوند. در نهايت، شيخ به دليل اذعان به تجرد تامه نفس و انحصار ادراك آن در كليات عقلي، از تبيينِ تجرد ادراكات جزيي خيالي بازمي‌ماند. رويكرد نهايي ابن‌سينا به خيال و ادراكات آن را بايد در ذيل نظريه خاص وي در باب وحدت نفس و قواي مختلف آن و همچنين اذعان به ناكارآمدي فرايند تجريد در تحصيل ادراكات متعاليِ مخزون در خيال جستجو نمود. شيخ بر اين اساس، در مواضع مختلف خيال را واجد كاركردها و شاخصه‌هايي مي‌داند كه بداهتاً مستلزم پذيرش تجرّد غير تامه آن خواهد بود.

Ibn Sina’s approach to the imaginative faculty (quwwah musawwirah, or khayâl) and its stored perceptions is without harmony. This paper tries to examine these different approaches and study this incoherence. In the first step, the Sheikh with respect to the principle thought of mashaei and the process of the knowledge abstraction to acquire self or soul (nafs) perceptions believes that it is necessary the materiality and its capacity for the distinction and recognition of partial imaginative perceptions and also believes the absolute (pure) materiality of imaginative perceptions and its capacity. In his second approach with a serious uncertainty, he criticized the materiality of imaginative perceptions. He affirmed in this position that imaginative representations (forms) should not be physical, unless with changing and evolution of body’s parts and the capacity of these forms mean the imaginative faculty should be changed. But at the end, because of propounding the abstraction of soul (self) perfection and the restriction of its perception to rational generalizations the sheikh could not present the abstraction of the partial imaginative perceptions specifically. The last approach of Avicenna to the imagination and its perceptions should be investigated under his special theory of the unity of soul (self) and its different faculties and also his affirming the inability of the process of the abstraction in acquiring the prime stored perceptions of the imagination. According to this, the sheikh in different positions believes that the imagination has functions and specifications which necessarily make the imperfectness (incompleteness) of the imagination apparently (in a glance look). Key words: Imagination, The imaginative perceptions, Disengagement, Abstraction.