پژوهشي متفاوت در روايات استصحاب با رويكرد احيا قاعده‌ي يقين

A Different Research on the Traditions of Istishab with the Approach to Reviving the Rule of Certitude

قاعده‌ي يقين به عنوان يكي از پنج قاعده‌ي محوري فقه مطرح مي‌شده است كه خود قواعدي چند از جمله استصحاب را در بر مي‌گرفته است، امّا به مرور زمان اين قاعده تجزيه شده است. قاعده‌ي استصحاب نيز ابتدا به عنوان دليل اجتهادي مطرح بوده است امّا پس از آن كه براي حجيّت آن به اخبار استناد شده است به لحاظ تعبدي بودن آن، به صورت يكي از اصول عمليه درآمده است تا آن‌جا كه شيخ انصاري آن اخبار را تنها شامل استصحاب و نه قاعده‌ي يقين، كه به شك ساري شهره شده است، مي‌داند و اين سخن وي مورد پذيرش غالب اصوليان قرار گرفته است، هرچند برخي از ايشان دلايلي را غير از دلايل وي بر اين مدّعا اقامه كرده‌اند. مجموعه‌ اين دلايل در دو مقام ثبوت و اثبات دسته بندي مي‌شود كه با بررسي و نقد آن‌ها چنين مي‌نمايد كه اين ادلّه هيچ‌كدام كافي نباشد و عموم روايات استصحاب هر دو قاعده را شامل مي‌شود بلكه بررسي اخبار مي‌رساند كه مورد آن‌ها اختصاص به استصحاب ندارد قواعدي همچون قاعده‌ي يقين و اشتغال نيز مورد اين روايات مي‌باشند.

The rule of certitude has been brought up as one of the five pivotal principles of jurisprudence, which in itself includes several principles such as istshab (presumed continuity), but over time it has been dissociated. Similarly, the rule of istshab has been mooted as discretionary (ijtahadi) reason; however, after resorting to traditions for its authenticity (hujjiyat) it has turned into one of the practical principles due to its being devotional to the extent that Shaykh Ansari regard those traditions only consisting of istshab and not the rule of certitude, which has been renowned as an inclusive doubt. This remark of him has been accepted by most of the (legal theorists) usulis, although some of them have given other reasons than his reasons for this claim. The total sum of these reasons are categorized into two states of approval and affirmation, which, upon being critically reviewed it seems that none of these reasons are sufficient and the traditions of istshab in general include both of the rules. A study of the traditions, rather, implies that their instances are not made exclusive to istshab, but such rules as the rule of certitude and indebtedness (ishtiqal) are instances of these traditions, as well.