قضاياي حسن و قبح: عقلاني يا عقلايي

The Theorems of Virtue and Indecency: Noetic of Rational

اين نوشتار به دنبال اثبات عقلاني بودن قضاياي حسن و قبح و ردّ عقلايي بودن آنهاست. ابتدا ديدگاه حكمايي همچون فارابي، ابن‌سينا و محقق طوسي مطرح شده كه قضاياي حسن و قبح را از مشهورات دانسته‌اند. سپس به دو تفسير از ديدگاه‌ حكما اشاره شد: حكيم لاهيجي قضاياي حسن و قبحْ را يقيني و حتي بديهي مي‌د‌اند، اما محقق اصفهاني اين بحث را از مشهورات بهشمار مي‌آورد. حق آن است كه از كلمات حكما، عقلاني بودن قضاياي حسن و قبح در كنار عقلايي بودن آنها فهميده مي‌شود؛ چه آنكه يك قضيه ممكن است از يك جهت جزو يقينيات باشد كه صدقش با برهان اثبات ‌گردد و از لحاظي ديگر، جزو مشهورات باشد كه واقعيتي جز شهرت و تطابق آراي عقلا نداشته باشد. در ادامه، به بررسي ادله محقق اصفهاني پرداختيم. اين دليل را كه چون قضاياي حسن و قبح بديهي نيستند پس مشهوري‌اند، نپذيرفتيم؛ چون نمي‌توان از عدم بداهت، عدم عقلي بودن را نتيجه گرفت. درباره دليل دوم كه عقلا صرفاً به سبب حفظ نظام اجتماعي به حسن و قبح حكم مي‌كنند، روشن شد كه عقلا در اعتبار احكام به مصالح و مفاسد واقعي توجه دارند، از‌اين‌رو حكم آنها منشا عقلاني دارد و صرفاً برخاسته از اعتبار نيست.

This paper intends to prove the noetic nature of the theorems of virtue and indecency and to refute their being rational. First, the viewpoints of such scholars as Alpharabius, Avicenna, and Muhaqiq ??s? who have considered the theorems of virtue and indecency as being among the generally accepted premises have been presented. Next, two interpretations from the viewpoint of those scholars was mentioned: L?h?j? views the theorems of virtue and indecency as being certain and even obvious. However, Mu?aqiq Isfahani considers this issue as generally accepted. The truth is that one can understand the rationality and noesis of the theorems of virtue and decency in the words of the famous Islamic scholars, because one theorem may from one aspect be among the certainties which its truth is proven with definite proof and from another perspective, it is among the generally accepted premises which has no reality except fame and conformity with the opinions of the wise. Furthermore, the reasoning of Mu?aqiq Isfahani has been dealt with. This argument that because the theorems of virtue and indecency are not obvious so then they are generally accepted has not been accepted, because one cannot conclude irrationality owing to the absence of obviousness. As for the second argument which states that the wise pass verdict on virtue and indecency purely on the grounds of preserving the social order, it became clear that the wise, in relation to the validity for the verdicts, pay attention to the real interests and corruptions. Therefore, their verdict has a rational origin and is not purely derived from validity.