ضعف اراده - آكراسيا ؛ چالشي معاصر درباره معنا

Weakness of Will (Acracy): Contemporary Challenges around Meaning

در ادبيات فلسفي معاصر، عمل عامدانه و آزادانه فرد برخلاف داوري بهترش همزمان با عناوين آكراسيا و ضعف اراده شناخته مي‌شود و بحث‌ها در اين حوزه بر سر امكان و تبيين چنين عملي است. اما ريچارد هولتون مدّعي است فيلسوفان در يكي دانستن آكراسيا و ضعف اراده مرتكب خطا شده‌اند. به عقيده او كاربران معمول زبان، ضعف اراده را وصف تغيير ناموجّه تصميم فرد مي‌دانند و تعبير «عمل خلاف داوري بهتر فرد» معناي مفهوم برساخته فيلسوفان يعني آكراسيا است. به‌ همين‌دليل او معتقد است پيش‌فرضي نادرست در بحث‌‌هاي دربارۀ ضعف اراده وجود دارد. آلفرد ملي كوشيد با توسل به روش‌هاي فلسفه‌هاي تجربي نشان دهد عقل سليم مدعاي هولتون را تأييد نمي‌‌كند. نقد او با پاسخ هولتون و مِي‌ همراه بود. در اين مقاله مي‌كوشيم ضمن بازخواني بحث‌هاي دامنه‌دار انجام شده دربارۀ اين موضوع نشان دهيم چرا هولتون چنين مدّعايي را مطرح مي‌كند، چرا اين بحث به فلسفه تجربي كشيده شده است و لوازم طرح بحث در چنين فضايي كدام است؟ و در پايان پس از ارزيابي ديدگاه‌هاي معرفي شده، تعريفي از ضعف اراده ارائه مي‌كنيم كه اولاً تا حدّ امكان به درك عقل سليم از اين مفهوم نزديك باشد و ثانياً موضوعيت مسئله سنّتي ضعف اراده (تببين امكان آن) را از ميان نبرد.

In contemporary philosophical literature, acting against one's better (all things considered) judgment is referred to as akrasia as well as "weakness of will". But the possibility of such an action and the way one can explain this possibility, is debatable. However, the debate has gone further and the very definition of the term "weakness of will" appears to be questionable. Richard Holton, claimed that when we look at discussions on "weakness of will", we see something other than what is supposed to be. He continues that common sense takes "weakness of will" to be something other than acting against one's better judgment. According to Holton, people attribute "weakness of will" to over-readily revising a resolution and failure to act on one's intention. He argues that philosophical debate is on akrasia (acting against one's better judgment) rather than weakness of will and there is a misconception here. Since he declares something about common sense, his claim would be experimentally falsifiable. Alfred Mele tried to examine the Holton's claim using the methods of experimental philosophy. Finally, Mele found that neither Holton nor the philosophical literature is correct. He proposed a disjunctive model for the attribution of 'weakness of will'. Then Holton and May criticized Mele's model and proposed a new model based on various experiments. Since then there is an ongoing debate on this issue. In this article I try to make a critical review of this current debate and to examine why Holton made such a claim, what are the implications of claiming that? Finally I propose a Hybrid model which covers the findings of experiments and reserves the importance of classical problem of "weakness of will" (i.e. the explanation of such an action) as discussed by philosophers